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Abstract 
 
According to conventional wisdom, family ownership, which signals a lack of social 
capital and trust in an economy, may impede innovation. This argument, however, 
fails to recognize that modern family firms can benefit from capitalist institutions that 
promote innovation. Using a comprehensive sample of U.S. family-owned public 
firms and patents for the period from 2000 to 2010, we show that family ownership 
promotes innovation and that this positive effect can be attributed to reduced financial 
constraints, a greater commitment to long-term value, and improved corporate 
governance. Causality is confirmed by an instrumental variable analysis using the 
state-level divorce rate and a difference-in-difference analysis based on changes in 
estate taxes (the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001). 
 
Keywords: Family firms, innovation, intangible investment 
JEL classification: G32, O32 
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“The competitive position of important U.S. industries has 
declined relative to those of other nation … Examples of 
[firms that can overcome the disadvantages of the American 
system]are companies that have permanent and active family 
ownership … which seem to enjoy competitive advantages in 
investing.”  
– Michael Porter (1992) 
 
Introduction 
Innovation and long-term investment are at the core of firm sustainability (Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Ettlie, 
1998) and national competitive advantage (Porter, 1992). One widespread concern has been the 
deteriorating global competitiveness of U.S. firms owing to the inefficient utilization of innovation capital. 
Interestingly, family ownership, one of the oldest types of business structures, is argued to potentially 
help “overcome the disadvantages of the American system” because such an ownership structure seems to 
“enjoy competitive advantages in investing” (Porter, 1992). However, this intuition contradicts the folk 
theorem that reliance on family ties and the prosperity of family firms signal a lack of social capital in 
general and a lack of trust in particular in an economy (e.g., Banfield, 1958; Putnam et al., 1993; 
Fukuyama, 1995; Mueller and Philippon, 2011) and that a lack of social capital or trust hinders 
innovation (Coleman, 1988; Hall and Jones, 1999).  
The latter inference based on the lack of trust, however, has been traditionally inferred from a context 
in which family firms operate in the absence of modern capitalist institutions. This relationship thus may 
not apply to the modern family firms considered by Porter (1992) in which innovation is less sensitive to 
the impact of distrust because the family firms are located in countries with good capitalist institutions. In 
this paper, we directly confront this issue and investigate whether family ownership and modern capitalist 
institutions foster innovation in a synergistic manner or whether the folk theorem still holds that even 
modernized family firms stifle innovation.
1
 Indeed, innovation usually involves experimentation that 
requires long-term effort despite a highly uncertain outcome and high failure rates (Holmstrom, 1989; 
Aghion and Tirole, 1994; Manso, 2011). Investing in innovation may therefore induce high information 
                                                 
1
 Family ownership is common in the U.S. (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Anderson and Reeb, 2003a) and is more 
pervasive internationally (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999; Claessens et al., 2002). Numerous 
previous studies focus on whether family ownership imposes agency costs especially on small investors (see, e.g., 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999; Claessens et al., 2002; Faccio and Lang, 2002; Volpin, 2002; 
Burkart et al., 2003; Durnev and Kim, 2005; Pérez-González, 2006; Bennedsen et al., 2007; Bertrand et al., 2008; 
Almeida et al., 2011; Ellul, Pagano, and Panunzi, 2010; Masulis, Pham, and Zein, 2011; Franks et al., 2012. Morck, 
Wolfenzon, and Yeung, 2005 and Khanna and Yafeh, 2007 provide two recent surveys) and whether family 
ownership alleviates financial constraints or leverages firm reputation (e.g., Gomes, 2000; Khanna, and Palepu, 
2000; Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2006; Masulis, Pham, and Zein, 2011). Although some studies examine the 
investment behavior of firms (Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Ellul, Pagano, and Panunzi, 2010; Anderson, Duru, and 
Reeb, 2012), the efficiency and quality of the outcome of such investment appears to be underexplored. 
2 
 
and agency costs (Hall and Lerner, 2010) and may be subject to various myopic incentives (e.g., Stein, 
1988, 1989; Shleifer and Vishny, 1990; Bushee, 1998). Given such complexity, the unique characteristics 
of modern family firms, such as long horizons, alignment between ownership and management, and high 
credit ratings, could stimulate innovation (innovation enhancing hypothesis). In contrast, if family firms 
are still associated with features known to hinder innovation, such as more conservative thinking 
(Coleman, 1988; Hall and Jones, 1999), if family firms’ business model is more prone to agency 
problems concerning minority shareholders, or if family firms experience financial constraints induced by 
the need to retain control, family ownership may stifle innovation (innovation stifling hypothesis).  
We test these alternative hypotheses by using data on the family ownership and patents of a 
comprehensive sample of public U.S. firms for the period from 2000 to 2010. We focus on patents rather 
than R&D spending as a proxy for innovation output because patents are tradable intellectual property 
with a liquid market (Lev 2001). The weekly reports issued by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) provide a clean, detailed source of innovation performance that allows the market to directly 
measure innovation and its economic value along multiple dimensions, such as quality versus quantity.
2
  
We start by providing evidence that family ownership is generally positively related to the quantity, 
quality, creativity, and versatility of patents. When we directly compare family firms to similar non-
family firms via propensity score matching, family firms are associated with 26% more patents filed, 29% 
more citations received, 29% higher originality scores, and 69% higher generality scores. The first figure 
indicates that family firms produce more patents. Additionally, the greater number of citations, higher 
originality, and higher generality indicate that innovation is also of higher quality in family firms than in 
non-family firms.  
This positive relationship between family ownership and innovation is confirmed by multivariate 
analyses in which we observe that family ownership is associated with approximately 11.5% more patents 
filed, 12.1% more citations of filed patents, 14.1% higher originality, and 30.0% higher generality for the 
whole sample. The estimates in the propensity score matched sample are 24.0%, 27.7%, 29.5%, and 61.7% 
for the number of patents filed, the number of citations, originality, and generality, respectively. This 
positive relationship is robust to alternative definitions of the main variables and econometric 
specifications. We also investigate the economic channels through which family ownership can promote 
innovation, including the possible benefits of long-term commitment, reduced financial constraints, and 
                                                 
2
 Indeed, prior studies have shown that patents provide necessary information about firm intangible asset levels and 
market values (Lerner, 1994; Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004; Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2005a). Conversely, 
R&D may be subject to several problems, such as agency costs (Jensen, 1993; Hall, 1993), managerial manipulation 
and outsourcing (Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Bushee, 1998), and misrepresentation of intangible assets (Lev and 
Sougiannis, 1996; Kothari, Laguerre, and Leone, 2002; Lev, Sarath, and Sougiannis, 2005). 
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improved governance. We provide strong evidence that family firm ownership is particularly effective in 
enhancing innovation through all these economic channels. 
We address potential endogeneity by using both an instrumental variable approach and an event-
based difference-in-difference test. We first utilize the state-level divorce rate as an instrument to explain 
cross-state variation in family ownership. The state-level divorce rate is an ideal instrument because 
disruptions, such as divorce, negatively affect the sustainability of family ownership (e.g., Stafford et al., 
1999; Danes and Amarapurkar, 2001; Galbraith, 2003; Olson et al., 2003; Rutherford et al., 2006). 
Moreover, the average divorce rate at the state level is not affected by a particular family firm, and the 
rate does not directly influence firm-level innovation. Rather, the state-level divorce rate is affected by 
state-level social capital factors, such as religion and culture (e.g., Sweezy and Tiefenthaler, 1996) and, 
therefore, meets the exclusion restriction in providing exogenous variation in the predominance of family 
business. Consistent with previous research, we find that the state divorce rate significantly reduces 
family ownership. We then instrument family ownership with the state divorce rate, and the results 
confirm our previous findings: family ownership enhances both the quality and quantity of patent output.  
We then consider an alternative identification strategy based on an event, the Economic Growth and 
Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (EGTRRA) of 2001, and the ensuing substantial drop in the federal estate 
tax rate. This law phased out the federal estate tax and entirely repealed it in 2010. Because estate and 
inheritance taxes have been demonstrated to negatively affect family firm growth (e.g., Brunetti, 2006; 
Ellul, Pagano, and Panunzi, 2010), the drastic cut in the federal estate tax provides an exogenous event 
that affects the incentive to further develop family firms. The results of a difference-in-difference test 
suggest that a decline in federal estate tax significantly increases both the quantity and quality of family 
firms’ patent output. These results, which are robust to the use of alternative testing windows and the joint 
use of the instrumental variable, confirm a general causal relation between family ownership and 
innovation in U.S. firms.
3
 
It is important to point out that our results are not driven by greater R&D spending among family 
firms. In fact, consistent with previous research, we observe a negative relationship between family 
ownership and R&D input.
4
 However, when we scale our main patent variables by lagged R&D—i.e., 
                                                 
3
 The state-level estate tax does not provide a good instrument because there is little cross-state variation in estate 
taxes during the early 2000s. Before EGTRRA, all state estate taxes were directly linked to the federal credit on a 
dollar-for-dollar basis (Francis, 2012). This credit effectively allowed states to share estate tax revenue with the 
federal government but did not impose an additional burden on family firms. EGTRRA gradually replaced the 
federal credit with a deduction between 2002 and 2005, which may pose additional state estate and inheritance taxes. 
However, the majority of states effectively relieve this state-level burden.  
4
 Morck, Strangeland, and Yeung (2000), Villalonga and Amit (2006), and Anderson, Duru, and Reeb (2012) 
demonstrate that family firms spend less on R&D. In addition, family ownership can be associated with poor 
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when we measure the realized efficiency of R&D inputs in terms of patent outputs—we find that family 
firms achieve a significant advantage in these efficiency variables. In other words, although family firms 
invest less in R&D, they perform efficiently, i.e., they produce more and better patents. This new 
observation contributes to the strand of literature on family ownership and R&D (Miller and Le Breton-
Miller, 2005; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Anderson, Duru, and Reeb, 2012).  
It is also important to note that the role of family ownership in corporate innovation and the 
innovation efficiency of family ownership changes over time. We find that the innovation efficiency of 
family firms (the R&D-scaled patent variables) improves with the reduction of the estate tax. These 
improvements suggest that family firms adapt to their institutional environment in affecting innovation. 
We also observe that cross-county trust within the U.S. still negatively affects the existence of family 
ownership but that the impact of trust on firm-level innovation becomes less prominent, if not marginal. 
In other words, the presence of modern capitalist institutions may partially suppress the negative impact 
of distrust on innovation and may allow family firms to overcome distrust when they engage in 
innovation. This conjecture is supported by the data: family firms, even when they are associated with 
low trust, can nonetheless promote innovation. These findings extend the existing literature taking the 
value of family ties as given and persistent (Banfield, 1958; Coleman, 1988; Putnam et al., 1993; 
Fukuyama, 1995; Hall and Jones, 1999) by illuminating the role of family ownership in innovation during 
the modern era.  
Our results also contribute to the body of literature on the effects of family ownership on operational 
performance and real activities by using a large dataset that includes all public U.S. firms. The empirical 
evidence regarding how family ownership affects firm valuation and performance is mixed in the U.S. 
(e.g., Anderson and Reeb, 2003a; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). We present new evidence by 
demonstrating that family firms can increase their performance by focusing on valuing-enhancing 
innovation activities. Our empirical results suggest that the advantages of financial stability and long-term 
commitment outweigh the disadvantages of under-diversification and nepotism. The net effect is 
increased innovation.  
Because previous studies have established a positive relation between patent activities and firm value 
(Lerner, 1994; Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2005a; Matolcsy and Wyatt, 2008; Hirshleifer, Hsu, and Li, 
2013; Cohen, Diether, and Malloy, 2013), our results suggest that family ownership may be beneficial to 
both controlling families and outside shareholders by providing a longer investment horizon. More 
                                                                                                                                                             
management practices (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007, 2010). However, Miller and Le Breton-Miller (2005) suggest 
that family firms tend to invest more in R&D over the long run.   
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important, our results provide evidence of the beneficial influence of family firms on economic growth 
through innovation, which creates positive externalities for the entire economy.  
Our study also adds to a growing stream of research on the effects of ownership composition and 
structure on innovation and intangible investment. Baysinger, Kosnik, and Turk (1991) and Lee and 
O’Neill (2003) observe that the concentration of institutional shareholders is positively associated with 
corporate R&D investments. Francis and Smith (1995) observe that firms with more concentrated 
ownership produce more patents. Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales (2013) demonstrate that institutional 
ownership increases patent citations because it is associated with more effective monitoring. We 
contribute to this literature by demonstrating that family ownership leads to more and better innovation 
after institutional ownership and concentration are controlled for, suggesting that the influence of family 
affiliation on innovation activities is distinct from that of institutional investors. This effect is intuitive 
given that family ownership differs from regular institutional ownership in longer investment horizons, 
tighter shareholder-manager relationships, and greater reputation concerns.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops testable hypotheses about the 
effects of family ownership on innovation. Section 3 presents our variables and summary statistics. 
Section 4 reports the baseline results and robustness checks. Section 5 provides our identification 
strategies, and Section 6 discusses the channels through which family ownership affects innovation. 
Section 7 reconciles our findings with the existing research, and Section 8 concludes. 
2. Hypotheses Development 
In this section, we present our hypotheses regarding the effect of family ownership on innovation. 
Although family firms are known to thrive in economies with lower levels of social capital (e.g., Banfield, 
1958; Putnam et al., 1993; Fukuyama, 1995; Mueller and Philippon, 2011), which may hinder innovation 
(Coleman, 1988; Hall and Jones, 1999); however, the same may not be true for U.S. family firms if they 
can fully adapt to institutions that are known to advance innovation. We therefore examine both the 
positive and the negative effects of family firms on innovation.  
We first consider the characteristics of family firms that are positively associated with innovation. For 
example, family firms are characterized by a long-term view that avoids the myopic and opportunistic 
behaviors that are typical of short-term investors (Stein, 1988; Bushee, 1998; He and Tian, 2013).
5
 This 
longer horizon also allows for the development and maintenance of a long-term relationship with 
employees (Weber et al., 2003; Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2005; Mueller and Philippon, 2011). This 
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 In addition, Fang, Tian, and Tice (2013) observe that increased stock liquidity invites hostile takeovers and myopic 
shareholders, which hinders innovation. 
6 
 
more stable environment further improves long-term planning, while managers innovate more and behave 
less myopically with greater job security (e.g., Acharya, Baghai, and Subramanian, 2012, 2013; 
Chemmanur and Tian, 2011).
6
 In addition, family firms tend to groom managers who share similar values 
and visions, likely making them more tolerant of failures from risky investments and ultimately fostering 
better innovation (e.g., Manso, 2011; Ederer and Manso, 2013; Tian and Wang, 2014). Overall, these 
considerations imply that the longer investment horizon makes family firms more likely to excel in 
innovation. 
Family firms also tend to possess different financing structures from other firms. Creditors are often 
reluctant to lend funds to risky, intangible investment and innovation (Aghion et al., 2004; Atanassov, 
Nanda, and Seru, 2007; Hsu, Tian, and Xu, 2014). However, family firms are more appreciated by lenders, 
and they command lower borrowing costs (Anderson and Reeb, 2003b), which implies that being a family 
firm alleviates the adverse effect of financing constraints for innovation and allows family firms to better 
plan and implement long-term projects. 
Finally, family ownership is associated with closer shareholder-manager alignment. This alignment is 
particularly important when the timeline of or uncertainty associated with an investment increases the 
adverse effects of information asymmetry.
7
 Innovation requires time, high-quality labor, and intensive 
capital inputs and delivers an output that is unpredictable and idiosyncratic (Hall and Lerner, 2010). If 
controlling families more effectively monitor managers (e.g., Anderson and Reeb, 2003a), they are better 
positioned to undertake long-term investments. All these discussions inform the following hypothesis: 
H1a (innovation enhancing hypothesis): Family ownership promotes more effective technological 
innovation. 
We now consider the potential negative effects of family ownership. First, although family ownership 
is associated with long-term commitment, this very long-term view may produce extreme conservatism. 
Indeed, the traditional view that family ties are associated with low trust and more conservative thinking 
(Coleman, 1988; Hall and Jones, 1999) may still apply to U.S. family firms. For instance, families may 
prefer the status quo and may remain preoccupied with their existing operations and business models 
(Schulze et al., 2001; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). This preoccupation increases family firms’ reluctance to 
embrace and efficiently implement new ideas (e.g., Levitt and March, 1988; Levinthal and March, 1993; 
Fernandez and Nieto, 2006).  
                                                 
6
 Both Sapra, Subramanian, and Subramanian (2013) and Atanassov (2013) demonstrate that state-level anti-
takeover laws boost local firms’ patent output.  
7
 For example, Seru (2011) demonstrates that research and development activities are associated with particularly 
high information asymmetries in conglomerates because of their organization size and geographic distance. 
7 
 
Second, family firms are likely to be more financially constrained. Indeed, retaining control over a 
firm may induce a family firm to bypass profitable investment opportunities or to implement them less 
efficiently, especially for long-term and highly uncertain projects. Additionally, controlling families tend 
to hold considerably under-diversified portfolios. Under-diversification often leads to higher risk-aversion 
and underinvestment in risky projects (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Faccio, Marchica, and Mura, 2011), 
and the incentive to engage in risky and ambitious R&D projects is ultimately reduced in family firms 
(Anderson, Duru, and Reeb, 2012).  
Third, family ownership may be subject to agency problems because of the combination of ownership 
and managerial control (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1988; DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2000; Anderson 
and Reeb, 2003a). Such problems may degenerate into nepotism if family firms prefer to appoint family 
members or friends to top positions rather than hiring professional outsiders, which often destroys firm 
value (Pérez-González, 2006; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Bennedsen et al., 2007; Belenzon and 
Berkovitz, 2010; Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007, 2010). Moreover, family firms may be less transparent 
than non-family firms (Fan and Wong, 2002). The joint effect of increased potential agency problems and 
information asymmetry is a reduction in the willingness and ability to innovate. This discussion informs 
the following alternative hypothesis: 
H1b (innovation stifling hypothesis): Family ownership stifles technological innovation. 
Before testing these hypotheses, we describe the data and main variables that we use. 
3. Data and Summary Statistics 
3.1. Family ownership 
We construct a database of family-owned U.S. firms following the approach of Masulis, Pham, and Zein 
(2011). The goal of this approach is to determine whether each public firm is ultimately owned by a 
family (including biologically linked families, individual entrepreneurs, and known alliances of 
families/entrepreneurs) or a non-family entity (including governments, widely held firms, collective 
investment funds, and widely held financial institutions).
8
 
                                                 
8
 We first examine whether an ownership classification of “Employees/Managers”, 
“Employees/Managers/Directors”, “Individual(s) or family(ies)”, or “One or more named individuals or families” 
involves families. Next, we determine whether other ownership categories, including “State, Public authority”, 
“Public authority, State, Government”, “Bank”, “Financial company”, “Industrial company”, “Insurance company”, 
“Mutual & Pension fund/Trust/Nominee”, “Mutual & Pension Fund/Nominee/Trust/Trustee”, “Private Equity firm”, 
“Foundation”, “Foundation/Research Institute”, “Venture capital firm”, “Hedge funds”, and “Other unnamed 
shareholders, aggregated”, include hidden family ownership. In an unreported analysis, we exclude individual 
entrepreneurs from our family definition and obtain consistent results. 
8 
 
We proceed in several steps. First, we merge the Osiris and Amadeus (from 2000 to 2007) and Orbis 
(from 2007 onward) databases from Bureau Van Dijk with the CRSP/Compustat database.
9
 These data 
sources provide the initial family ownership information for the period from 2000 to 2011. However, 
some ownership information is missing, and some requires further verification. Therefore, to maximize 
the coverage and accuracy of our sample, we manually verify and augment family ownership information 
by using company annual reports and various information sources, such as LexisNexis and Factiva.  
The controlling shareholder of a firm is the largest shareholder who effectively controls (directly or 
through the holdings of affiliates) at least 20% of the firm’s voting rights. The same threshold is utilized 
in La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) on controlling rights in general and Masulis, Pham, 
and Zein (2011) on family ownership in particular. Later sections will show that our results are robust to 
other thresholds. For indirect ownership, we add the voting rights of a firm across a possible pyramid 
structure until we determine its ultimate owner. 
We then define a dummy variable for family ownership (hereinafter, Family Dummy) that takes the 
value one if the ultimate owner is a family and if the family ownership is at least 20% and zero otherwise. 
Alternatively, we compute the ultimate family ownership for each firm as a fraction of the total voting 
rights (hereinafter, Family Ownership), with the variable ranging between 0 and 1. These variables 
provide two measures of family ownership. Because family ownership is quite sticky, we conduct this 
analysis for four years in the sample period: 2002, 2005, 2008, and 2011.
10
 That is, we manually verify 
and augment the level of family ownership for each firm within the merged sample for these four years 
and rely on this correction for the closest year for the other years. For instance, in 2006, we utilize the 
family identities obtained in 2005 to determine the level of firm ownership.  
To avoid the potential bias introduced by young firms with short histories of operation or small firms 
with majority shares controlled by entrepreneurs, we focus on firms with annual sales greater than 100 
million dollars and a firm age (since being included in the Compustat database) greater than 5 years. 
3.2. Innovation measures 
We follow previous research and use firm-level patent data to capture the output of firms’ creative and 
inventive activities (e.g., Kamien and Schwartz, 1975; Griliches, 1990). We retrieve the patent records of 
all public firms from the updated NBER patent database. For each patent granted by the US Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) from 1976 to 2006, the database provides the following information: the 
                                                 
9
 We use NCUSIP and Ticker to match the identities of firms between the Bureau Van Dijk and CRSP datasets. 
10
 Our sample includes 788 unique firms that have been family owned. Of these firms, sixteen experienced a 
transition in family ownership (i.e., they were non-family-owned at the beginning of our sample period or became 
non-family-owned by the end of the sample period).  
9 
 
patent assignees (i.e., the firm that filed the patent application), the Compustat-matched firm identifiers 
(GVKEY), the technology class, the filing date (i.e., the date on which the firm filed the patent 
application), a list of prior patents that are cited by the designated patent, and a list of subsequent patents 
that cite the designated patent through 2006.
 11
 These details are crucial for the public to understand the 
technical content and business value of patents and to allow us to measure the innovative activities of 
each public firm along multiple dimensions. As suggested by Griliches (1990), “[n]othing else even 
comes close in the quantity of available data, accessibility, and the potential industrial, organizational, and 
technological detail.”  
We then extend our patent data by manually matching the NBER patent database to the HBS patent 
inventor database of all patents granted by the USPTO through the end of 2010 (Lai et al., 2011; Gao, 
Hsu, and Li, 2014). Using information regarding the names and locations of patenting entities (including 
firms, governments, organizations, and institutions) from the NBER patent database, we identify the 
entities of 82.4% of patents granted during the 2007-2010 period. Therefore, for all patenting public firms 
contained in the NBER patent database, we obtain their patent records for the 1976-2010 period.  
We consider four major innovation measures: patent counts, patent citations, patent originality, and 
patent generality. The details are provided in the Appendix. The first measure of firm-level innovation 
output, Patenti,t, is the logarithmic value of one plus the patent counts of firm i in year t. The patent count 
is the number of successful patent applications filed by firm i during year t that are eventually granted by 
the USPTO.
12
 This simple, straightforward proxy captures firm innovation output from a quantitative 
perspective, and it has been widely used in economics research (e.g., Griliches, 1981; Hall, 1993). 
Kamien and Schwartz (1975) survey the literature and note that “[n]evertheless, systematic study of 
patenting behavior has led Schmookler, Scherer, and others to conclude that the number of patents 
granted a firm is a usable proxy for inventive outputs.” Following Lerner (1994) and Aghion, Van Reenen, 
and Zingales (2013), we use a logarithmic transformation to mitigate the skewness of the distribution of 
patent counts. 
The second measure of firm-level innovation output is qualitative. This proxy (Citationi,t) is the 
logarithmic value of one plus the number of patent citations received by all successful patent applications 
filed by firm i in year t. This measure is sometimes referred to as the citation-weighted patent count and 
reflects a firm’s innovation output based on its patent quality. Prior studies often use the number of 
                                                 
11
 The NBER patent database was originally developed by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005a), and an updated 
version of this dataset is available at https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject/Home.  
12
 We also recognize the application-approval lag in patent counts, as it usually takes two to three years for a patent 
application to be approved by the USPTO (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2005b). When we restrict our sample to 
patents granted up to 2007, we obtain consistent results, which are reported in the Internet Appendix.  
10 
 
citations received by a patent to measure the patent’s technological contribution and economic value 
(Trajtenberg, 1990; Harhoff et al., 1999; Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2005a; Aghion, Van Reenen, and 
Zingales, 2013). The intuition is that the total number of citations across all patents filed by a firm in a 
sample year delivers a balanced estimate for its innovation output. We adjust the number of citations 
received by each patent by the technology category and application year, as suggested by Hall, Jaffe, and 
Trajtenberg (2005b), to correct for truncation bias because it takes time for patents to accumulate citations.  
In addition to the quantity and quality of patents, we are also interested in other dimensions of 
innovation intensity, such as creativity and versatility. Therefore, we consider patent originality and 
generality as developed by Trajtenberg, Henderson, and Jaffe (1997). Originality and generality are based 
on the distribution of technology classes of citing and cited patents, respectively. Our third measure of 
firm-level innovation output, Originalityi,t, is the logarithmic value of one plus the sum of originality 
scores of patents filed by firm i in year t. The originality score of each patent is defined as one minus the 
Herfindahl index of the technology class distribution of all patents that have been cited by the designated 
patent. The USPTO assigns each patent to the best match among three-digit technology classes consisting 
of all inventions with similar technology compositions and properties.
13
 When a patent cites prior patents 
from many different technology classes, the patent is considered to be more creative and original because 
it draws knowledge from a wider range of technologies and because it deviates from existing technology 
trajectories. The originality scores of all patents filed by a firm in a sample year provide an estimate that 
weights each patent by its originality. Thus, Originality measures firm-level innovation output by 
considering the creativity of a firm’s patents.    
The final measure of firm-level innovation output, Generalityi,t, is the logarithmic value of one plus 
the sum of the generality scores of patents filed by firm i in year t. The generality score of each patent is 
defined as one minus the Herfindahl index of the technology class distribution of all patents that cite the 
designated patent (Trajtenberg, Henderson, and Jaffe, 1997). When a patent is cited by subsequent patents 
in many technology classes, the patent is considered to be more general because it can be applied to 
various technology areas and industries. The generality scores of all patents filed by a firm in a sample 
year provide an estimate that weights each patent by its generality; Generality measures firm-level 
innovation output by considering the versatility of a firm’s patents.    
The use of a one-year horizon to construct these innovation measures is consistent with previous 
research. Patent flow is more informative of market value than patent stock (e.g., Hall, 1993; Hall, Jaffe, 
and Trajtenberg, 2005a) and is less subject to long-term trends within firms. Nevertheless, we also 
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 The detailed list is available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/cbcby.htm. 
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consider cumulative innovation proxies with two- and three-year horizons (i.e., year t+2 and year t+3, 
respectively) in our robustness checks and obtain consistent results. 
3.3. Other control variables 
We also consider a set of firm-level control variables that likely affect the scale of firm innovation and 
firm innovation strategies. Firm age (Firm age) reflects the life-cycle stage that determines innovation 
strategies. The market-to-book ratio (M/B) is commonly considered to be a proxy of growth options that 
reflect the value of a firm’s intangible assets and future profits. The logarithm of total assets (Asset) 
reflects a firm’s size that may affect the scale of its innovation output. The logarithm of annual R&D 
expenditures plus one (R&D) and the logarithm of annual capital expenditures plus one (CAPEX) measure 
the amount of investment in intangible and tangible assets, respectively. Capital intensity is defined as the 
logarithm of total assets divided by the number of employees and reflects innovation choices (e.g., Hall 
and Ziedonis, 2001; Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales, 2013). Leverage is defined as long-term debt and 
current debt divided by total assets and is expected to constrain a firm’s innovation investment (e.g., 
Aghion et al., 2004; Hsu, Tian, and Xu, 2014). Profit margin is defined as operating income divided by 
total sales and reflects a firm’s market positioning and competitive strategy. All these variables are 
constructed with the financial and accounting data obtained from the Compustat database; their detailed 
definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
We also control for institutional ownership following Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales (2013), who 
demonstrate that institutional ownership is positively associated with innovation. Institutional ownership (% 
Inst Own) is defined as the percentage of shares owned by all institutional investors reported in the 
Thomson Reuters Institutional (13f) Holdings dataset. In addition, we control for the concentration of 
institutional ownership owing to the reduced monitoring power, higher agency costs, and free-rider 
problems associated with diffused ownership that may affect innovation investment and performance 
(Baysinger, Kosnik, and Turk, 1991; Francis and Smith, 1995; Lee and O’Neill, 2003). The degree of 
institutional ownership concentration (Own Concentration) is measured by the Herfindahl index defined 
as the sum of the squared ownership percentages owned by individual institutional shareholders. 
Although the nature of family ownership is very different from that of institutional ownership, to address 
the concern that our results may be driven by institutional ownership, we include institutional ownership 
and its concentration in our analysis.  
3.4. Summary statistics 
The main sample consists of 17,025 firm-year observations (3,260 unique firms) for the period from 2000 
to 2010. The sample size is determined by family ownership data beginning in 2000 and innovation 
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variables ending in 2010. Panel A of Table 1 reports the summary statistics (including the mean, standard 
deviation, 25th percentile, median, and 75th percentile) for the innovation variables, family ownership 
dummies and percentages, and other control variables that are used in our regression analyses. Patent has 
a mean value of 0.61 (corresponding to an average of 0.84 patents per year) and a standard deviation of 
1.30, and Citation has a mean value of 0.73 (corresponding to an average of 1.08 citations per year) and a 
standard deviation of 1.76. The medians of these variables are zero, consistent with numerous studies in 
innovation research.  
Originality has a mean value of 0.46 (corresponding to an average originality score of 0.58 per year) 
and a standard deviation of 1.06, and Generality has a mean value of 0.19 (corresponding to an average 
generality score of 0.21 per year) and a standard deviation of 0.66. Generality is, on average, lower than 
Originality because it takes time for a patent to accumulate citations. Nevertheless, this issue does not 
systematically bias our statistical inferences because it affects all firms.  
In our sample, 11% of sample firms are family-owned. This fraction is consistent with that reported in 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999), although these authors focus mainly on mid-size firms. 
In addition, 5% of the outstanding shares of all public firms are controlled by families. The standard 
deviations for the family dummy and percentage are 0.31 and 0.15, respectively. We also note that the 
average age of public firms is approximately 25 years, with a standard deviation of 18 years. In terms of 
size, an average firm owns 1,064 million dollars in total assets and spends 4.8 and 38.5 million dollars in 
R&D and capital expenditures, respectively. In addition, an average firm has a market-to-book ratio of 
2.56, a capital intensity ratio of 5.56, a leverage ratio of 0.22, and a profit margin ratio of 0.09. 
Panel B compares the major characteristics of family firms to those of non-family firms and presents 
the p-values for these differences. Family firms are younger, smaller, and characterized by lower levels of 
institutional ownership and less R&D spending than non-family firms. Such a direct comparison of the 
innovation output between family firms and non-family firms, however, is less informative, because 
innovation might be contaminated by differences in these characteristics. In other words, to highlight the 
impact of family ownership on innovation, one needs to control for firm characteristics. Panel C achieves 
this goal by creating propensity score matched samples for family and non-family firms. Specifically, 
propensity scores are created every year based on probit regressions that include all the characteristics 
tabulated in Panel B and industry fixed effects, which allow us to select, for each family firm, a non-
family firm that has similar characteristics to function as its control group. We verify that family firms 
and firms in the control group have indistinguishable characteristics; the results of the test are reported in 
Table A1 of the Internet Appendix. Panel C then reports the results for the innovation variables for both 
family firms and firms in the control group. 
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In general, family firms are associated with more patents filed relative to non-family firms with 
similar characteristics. The mean value of Patent is 0.258 for family firms, which is approximately 25.9% 
higher than the value for non-family firms.
14
 This difference is statistically significant. Furthermore, 
family firms seem to produce better patents, in terms of Citation, Originality, and Generality, than firms 
in the control group. Specifically, being a family firm is associated with 29% more citations received, 29% 
higher originality scores, and 69% higher generality scores. These summary statistics provide initial 
support for the innovation-enhancing hypothesis, which we will examine in a multivariate framework in 
the next section. 
4. Main Relationship 
We now consider the link between family ownership and innovation. We first report the main results and 
then assess their robustness.  
4.1. Baseline results 
To empirically examine whether family ownership affects innovation, we estimate the following pooled 
regression: 
                                                           ,    (1) 
where            denotes the different innovation output measures of firm i in industry j in year t+1 for 
Patenti,t+1, Citationi,t+1, Originalityi,t+1, and Generalityi,t+1.           is a family dummy variable, and 
            denotes a list of control variables: Firm agei,t, the age of firm i in year t; M/Bi,t, the market-to-
book ratio of firm i in year t; % Inst Owni,t, the percentage of institutional shareholders of firm i in year t; 
Own Concentrationi,t, the concentration of institutional shareholders of firm i in year t; Asseti,t, the 
logarithmic total assets of firm i in year t; R&Di,t, the logarithmic R&D expenditures reported by firm i in 
year t; Capital intensityi,t, the asset-to-employee ratio of firm i in year t; CAPEXi,t, the logarithmic capital 
expenditures reported by firm i in year t; Leveragei,t, the total debt ratio of firm i in year t; and Profit 
margini,t, the profit margin of firm i in year t.          denotes the industry fixed effects for firm i that 
in industry j as defined by the two-digit SIC codes, and      denotes the year fixed effects in year t.  
The inclusion of industry and year fixed effects helps address the inherent heterogeneity in innovation 
across industries (such as high-tech industries relative to other industries) or years (such as general 
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 The value of Patent is 0.205 for non-family firms, suggesting that being a family firm increases, on average, the 
magnitude of the variable Patent by (0.258-0.205)/0.205=25.9%. Note that the whole sample mean for Patent is 
0.61, as discussed above, suggesting that the distribution of patents is highly skewed among firms. However, the 
skewness is much smaller among family firms and firms in the control group. Because of this observation, later 
sections present robustness checks for our main regression analyses based on the propensity score matched samples. 
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technology revolutions and waves relative to other periods).
15
 We cluster the standard errors in two 
dimensions by industry and year. We obtain consistent results if we use standard errors that are two-way 
clustered by firm and year (we will discuss these results shortly).  
Table 2 reports the results for Equation (1), which provides strong support for the positive effect of 
family ownership on innovation. In Panel A, we find that the coefficient estimates of the family dummies 
are 7.0%, 8.8%, 6.5%, and 5.7% for Patenti,t+1, Citationi,t+1, Originalityi,t+1, and Generalityi,t+1, 
respectively; they are all statistically significant. We can estimate the economic impact of family 
ownership on innovation as              ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, where    is the regression coefficient on the family dummy 
and           ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ refers to the average value of the dependent variable in the sample. This magnitude 
measures the degree to which innovation differs between a family firm (when the dummy variable takes 
the value of one) and a non-family firm (when the dummy variable takes the value of zero) relative to its 
average. Family firms are associated with 11.5% more patents filed, 12.1% more citations of filed patents, 
14.1% greater originality, and 30% greater generality than non-family firms. Although the economic 
magnitudes are highly significant, they may underestimate the impact of family ownership when family 
ownership has a skewed distribution. We will revisit the economic magnitude shortly based on the 
propensity score matched samples reported in Table 1. 
In Panel B, we use the family ownership percentage rather than the family dummy as a robustness 
check and obtain consistent results for the positive relation between family ownership and innovation. 
The coefficient estimates of the family ownership percentage are all positive and statistically significant at 
the 1% or 5% level for Patenti,t+1, Citationi,t+1, Originalityi,t+1, and Generalityi,t+1. These results not only 
confirm the positive relation between family ownership and innovation output but also suggest that our 
findings in Panel A are not driven by the selected threshold for family-owned firms. In other words, the 
positive relationship between family ownership and innovation is a general pattern, not a specific 
outcome of the 20% threshold for family ownership that we used to define family dummy.  
Among the control variables, we find that innovation increases with firm age, market-to-book ratio, 
and total assets, which suggests that mature firms, growth firms, and large firms produce more patents. 
When we control for total assets in the regressions, the coefficients for firm age and market-to-book ratio 
remain significant and positive. The positive effect of firm age may be attributed to learning that favors 
experienced firms, whereas the positive effect of market-to-book ratio confirms that the value of growth 
options increases with the prospect of a firm’s patent portfolio strength. The relationship between 
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 We recognize the potential time-varying industry effect. For example, some industries may experience rapid, 
revolutionary technology changes in some years or may be subject to greater competition pressure that also affects 
innovation output (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007). In the robustness check section, we estimate Equation (1) with 
industry-year joint fixed effects (i.e.,                 ) and obtain consistent results. 
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institutional ownership and innovation output is insignificant, whereas ownership concentration is 
positively and significantly associated with innovation output. The latter finding is consistent with 
previous studies reporting that concentrated ownership is associated with higher R&D (Baysinger, Kosnik, 
and Turk, 1991; Lee, and O’Neill, 2003) and higher patent output (Francis and Smith, 1995). Later 
section will also illustrate that the impact of institutional ownership becomes significant once ownership 
concentration is removed. The positive relation between R&D and innovation output is intuitive because 
intangible investments are expected to generate intellectual property. The positive relation between 
CAPEX and innovation output suggests that complementarity exists between tangible and intangible 
investments. Capital intensity is not significantly correlated with innovation output, although the 
coefficient is positive. Unsurprisingly, higher leverage leads to lower innovation output, which is 
consistent with previous research. Finally, profit margin is negatively associated with innovation output, 
but its coefficient is insignificant.  
4.2. Robustness checks and discussions 
Although Table 2 shows that a strong, positive association exists between innovation output and family 
ownership, we consider additional robustness checks. We provide detailed tables in the Internet Appendix 
and discuss only the main findings. 
We first conduct two robustness checks to demonstrate that our results are not affected by the skewed 
distribution of family firms in the economy or the definition of family ownership. To address potential 
econometrics issues that could arise because family firms are outnumbered by non-family firms in the 
U.S., Table A1 of the Internet Appendix provides propensity score matched samples between family and 
non-family firms. Propensity score matching allows us to compare family firms with non-family firms of 
similar characteristics in a more balanced sample. We find that the main impact of family ownership on 
innovation remains in this balanced sample.
16
 The economic magnitude is consistent with Panel C of 
Table 1 and higher than our estimations based on the whole-sample regressions reported in Table 2. In 
Panel A, for instance, we find that the coefficient estimates of family dummies are 4.9%, 7.4%, 4.2%, and 
3.3% for Patenti,t+1, Citationi,t+1, Originalityi,t+1, and Generalityi,t+1, respectively; they are all statistically 
significant. The average values for patents, citations, originality, and generality are 0.200, 0.267, 0.142, 
and 0.053, respectively, in the matched sample. Hence, family firms are associated with 24.0% more 
patents filed, 27.7% more citations of filed patents, 29.5% greater originality, and 61.7% greater 
generality than non-family firms with similar characteristics. The economic magnitudes suggest that 
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 This comparison also addresses the potential selection bias that only superior family firms are listed. Because 
family and non-family firms in this test have similar characteristics, one group is unlikely to be more susceptible to 
this selection bias than the other group.  
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family ownership may play a crucial role in promoting innovation in an economy with advanced 
institutions.  
In Table A2 of the Internet Appendix, we check the robustness of our results by redefining the family 
dummy based on 30% and 40% ownership thresholds. These alternative definitions do not change the 
positive relationship between family ownership and innovation. In addition, (unreported) tests excluding 
individual owners from our definition of family ownership also yield consistent results. In short, our main 
results are robust to the definition of family ownership. 
The second set of robustness checks explores the impact of the distribution of our dependent 
variable—innovation. One potential concern regarding the innovation variables is that they are right-
skewed with many zeroes. In all our regressions, we use logarithmic transformations of raw innovation 
measures to alleviate this impact. Alternatively, we can focus on firm-year observations with non-zero 
innovation measures. Table A3 of the Internet Appendix presents the results of this test, which are 
consistent with the main results.  
We also recognize that a two- to three-year lag between the patent application date and the final 
approval date may exist. To alleviate concerns that our results may be driven by patents applied but not 
granted by the end of 2010, we restrict our sample to the 2000-2007 period and, again, we obtain 
consistent results (reported in Table A4 of the Internet Appendix). Related to this time issue, in our main 
specification (Table 2), we relate family ownership in year t to innovation output in year t+1. This time 
convention is commonly used in the literature, because prior empirical studies have posited that it takes 
less than one year for increases in R&D input to generate increases in patent applications (Hausman, Hall, 
and Griliches, 1984; Hall, Griliches, and Hausman, 1986; Lerner and Wulf, 2007). Nevertheless, Table 
A5 of the Internet Appendix considers innovation output over two- and three-year horizons. This 
specification also better controls for reverse causality because future innovation output is unlikely to 
affect current family ownership once the current R&D level has been controlled for. We obtain consistent 
results from this test.  
We then conduct a third set of robustness checks related to our control variables. Recall that Table 2 
reports a positive yet insignificant impact of institutional ownership on innovation. The lack of 
significance, however, may simply arise because high institutional ownership implies high ownership 
concentration. Once we remove the latter variable from the regression, as reported in Table A6 of the 
Internet Appendix, institutional ownership has a positive and significant impact on innovation. In later 
analyses (Section 6.3), we will further confirm the positive effect of institutional ownership on innovation 
by demonstrating that innovation significantly increases as the number of institutional investors with a 
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long investment horizon increases and that the governing role of institutional investors is replaced by 
family ownership to a certain extent.  
Another potential issue related to the control variables is that, following prior corporate finance 
studies, we do not include current innovation output (        ). This omission is unlikely to affect our 
inferences because R&D is included in Equation (1). Nonetheless, we include current innovation output in 
the regressions in a robustness check and we obtain consistent results (reported in Table A7 of the 
Internet Appendix).  
Among the control variables, size might play an important role that may not be fully captured by a 
linear control. To address its potential nonlinear impact, we also consider size-adjusted innovation 
performance by scaling the innovation measures with total assets. Table A8 of the Internet Appendix 
presents the results of this test, which are consistent with the main results. Thus, our main finding is not 
affected by the size of the sample firms. Finally, to verify that our results are not driven by different asset 
sales and acquisition behaviors between family and non-family firms, we exclude firm-year observations 
during which firms engage in asset sales or M&A activities (as acquirers) during a period ranging from t-
1 to t+1. Tables A9 and A10 show that our main results remain robust to these specifications.  
The last set of robustness checks concern our econometric specifications. Before we discuss them, we 
should note that we follow the literature on the real effects of family ownership (e.g., Anderson, Duru, 
and Reeb, 2009, 2012) and do not include firm fixed effects in our main specifications for the following 
reasons. First, given our wide and short panel of 3,260 firms over 11 years (2000-2010), we are interested 
in the cross-sectional relation between innovation and family ownership across firms. Second, as 
suggested by Zhou (2001), estimates of the real effects of firm-level ownership structure should not 
include firm fixed effects because ownership structure varies substantially across firms but changes 
slowly over time, and firm innovation may be highly correlated with this individual effect, leading any 
effect of family ownership to be absorbed by firm fixed effects (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2005a; Hall, 
Thoma, and Torrisi, 2007; Noel and Schankerman, 2013). Third, given the large cross-section in our 
sample (over 1,000), each firm can reasonably be assumed to be a random draw from the same population 
(e.g., Petersen, 2009).
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To alleviate the concern that unobservable industry-year factors may drive our results, we include 
industry-year joint fixed effects in the regression. These joint fixed effects incorporate factors that vary 
across time and industry, and our results remain robust to such specifications (reported in Table A11 of 
the Internet Appendix). Finally, we follow Petersen (2009) and double-cluster standard errors by firm and 
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 More detailed reasons are provided in Zhou (2001), Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005a), Hall, Thoma, and Torrisi 
(2007), and Noel and Schankerman (2013). 
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year. Our results remain robust to this specification (shown in Table A12). Overall, the results of the tests 
reported in this section suggest that the main relationship between family ownership and innovation is 
highly robust to alternative specifications. 
5. Endogeneity Issues 
One major concern is endogeneity—e.g., reverse causality, omitted variables, or unobservable factors. For 
example, the positive relation between family ownership and subsequent innovation may be due to 
technology waves that correlate with the time trend of family ownership. This explanation is, however, 
unconvincing because we include year fixed effects in the regression.  
A second potential alternative explanation is that some industries experience strong technological 
growth in our sample period, and the majority of the firms in these industries are family owned. 
Nevertheless, this explanation does not hold, as we have controlled for industry fixed effects in Equation 
(1) and industry-year joint fixed effects (shown in Table A11 of the Internet Appendix). In fact because 
industry-year joint fixed effects absorb any time-varying industry-specific factor, these test results are not 
vulnerable to omitted variables at the industry level.  
A third concern is reverse causality: expected strong innovation growth may strengthen family 
ownership. Specifically, family shareholders may be reluctant to liquidate stocks if they expect strong 
subsequent innovation growth in the family-owned firm. This argument implies that family ownership is 
an increasing function of current innovation output and/or R&D input because both of these factors affect 
future innovation. To mitigate this reverse causality concern, we include R&D input and current 
innovation in Equation (1) and obtain consistent results (reported in Table A7 of the Internet Appendix).  
Of course, there could be firm-specific characteristics that are spuriously related to family ownership 
and that cannot be captured by industry and time fixed effects. In the following subsections, we directly 
address this issue by using two approaches: an instrumental variable specification and an exogenous 
shock based on a regulatory change (a reduction in the federal-level estate tax rate).  
5.1. Instrumental variable regressions with the state-level divorce rate 
We use the state-level divorce rate from the 2000 U.S. Census as an instrumental variable because divorce 
rates are likely to affect family ownership (relevance condition) and to be unrelated to future innovation 
output (exclusive condition). Previous research provides strong evidence of the impact of divorce on the 
output of family businesses. For instance, family disruptions, such as divorce, negatively affect the 
sustainability of a family business (e.g., Stafford et al. 1999; Danes and Amarapurkar, 2001; Galbraith, 
2003; Olson et al., 2003; Rutherford et al., 2006). Furthermore, the average divorce rate at the state level 
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cannot be affected by firm actions. Rather, divorce rate is more likely affected by state-level factors, such 
as religion and culture (e.g., Sweezy and Tiefenthaler, 1996). Finally, we do not expect the state-level 
divorce rate to influence firm-level innovation directly through channels that are unrelated to family 
ownership (exclusion restriction). Indeed, when we regress the four innovation variables on the state-level 
divorce rate (reported in Table A13 of the Internet Appendix in the interest of space), we find that the 
instrument has insignificant explanatory power on the dependent variables. This lack of significance 
confirms that the instrument meets the exclusion restrictions. Hence, the state-level divorce rate serves as 
an ideal identifying instrument. 
We use the state-level divorce rate in 2000 (the first year of our sample year) as our instrument 
because it is less affected by the economic or social changes that occurred during the sample period 
(2000-2010).
18
 In the first stage of the instrumental variable approach, we estimate the following 
regression for family ownership: 
                                                          ,                 (2) 
where          denotes the state-level divorce rate for firm i located in state k in year t.           
denotes the family ownership dummy (percentage) in Panel A (B). We then use Equation (2) to 
instrument           and derive the predicted value of          
 .
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 As reported in Column (1) of Panels 
A and B of Table 3, the state-level divorce rate negatively affects family ownership and thus meets the 
relevance condition. In terms of economic significance, a one-standard deviation increase in the average 
state-level divorce rate is related to a 3.5% reduction in the presence of family firms. 
We then replace the family ownership dummies or percentage in Equation (1) with their predicted 
values from Equation (2) and re-estimate the innovation-family ownership regression. As indicated in 
Table 3, family ownership retains its significant, positive coefficients in forecasting all the innovation 
measures. In Panel A, we find that the coefficient estimates of the predicted family ownership dummies 
are 1.25, 1.82, 1.06, and 0.72 for Patenti,t+1, Citationi,t+1, Originalityi,t+1, and Generalityi,t+1, respectively; 
they are all statistically significant at the 1% level. Panel B shows that the coefficient estimates of the 
predicted family ownership percentages are 32.5%, 51.1%, 36.6%, and 46.8% for Patenti,t+1, Citationi,t+1, 
Originalityi,t+1, and Generalityi,t+1, respectively; they are all statistically significant at the 5% level. With a 
one-standard deviation increase in the predicted family ownership percentage (10%), a firm’s innovation 
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 We obtain these data from the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). The average state-level divorce 
rate is 0.44% per couple with considerable cross-state variation, ranging as high as 0.96% and 0.86% in Nevada and 
Vermont, respectively, and as low as 0.20% and 0.24% in Connecticut and Montana, respectively. 
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 We include all the control variables that are used in Equation (1) for appropriate statistical inferences except R&D. 
We intentionally exclude R&D from the first-stage regression to ensure that          
  does not contain any 
information related to R&D that is directly correlated with future innovation output. 
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output increases (approximately) by 3.25% in quantity, by 5.11% in quality, 3.66% in creativity, and 4.68% 
in versatility. Overall, Table 3 indicates that the positive relation between family ownership and 
subsequent innovation output is not affected by unobservable factors, supporting a causal interpretation of 
the relation. 
5.2. Drop in the federal estate tax rate 
We then consider a second identification strategy based on an event: a law-induced substantial drop in the 
federal estate tax rate in 2002. Inheritance taxes are commonly accepted to negatively affect the growth of 
family firms.
20 
The federal estate tax was first enacted in 1916, and the heirs of any property are subject to 
this tax. In 2001, the Bush administration enacted EGTRRA (or the Bush Tax Cut), which made sweeping 
changes to the federal estate tax.
21
 The maximum estate tax rate was 55% in 2001, and EGTRRA was set 
to reduce the tax rate to 50% in 2002 with an additional reduction of 1% each year until 2007 to produce a 
maximum estate tax rate of 45%. In addition, the tax exemption amount increased from $675,000 in 2001 
to $1,000,000 in 2002, $1,500,000 in 2004, and $2,000,000 in 2006. Such a policy change not only favors 
the maintenance and development of family firms but also encourages their shareholders to invest in 
promising innovation projects because they will capture more of their value and will be less subject to 
liquidity constraints. We can therefore use a difference-in-difference approach to examine the effect of 
family ownership on innovation output as follows: 
                                                                       ,   (3) 
where            denotes a dummy that equals one if year t is 2002 or 2003 and zero if year t is 2000 or 
2001.           denotes the family ownership dummy (percentage) in Panel A (Panel B). We restrict the 
sample for these regressions to a four-year window that consists of two years pre- and post-event: 2000, 
2001, 2002, and 2003 (i.e., t = 2000 to 2003). All other variables are the same as those in Equation (1).  
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 Brunetti (2006) finds that the sales of family business are significantly associated with the estate tax owed by 
using a micro-level dataset of San Francisco County probate court records from 1979 to 1982. Ellul, Pagano, and 
Panunzi (2010) demonstrate that inheritance taxes significantly reduce family firm investment in a large panel of 
firms in 38 countries during the 1990-2006 period. 
21
  There is little cross-state variation in estate taxes because the federal estate tax rate is higher than and provides 
full credit toward state estate taxes (Francis, 2012). The state estate tax credit, which effectively shared part of the 
estate tax payable to the federal government, was phased out between 2002 and 2005 by EGTRRA. The 2001 tax 
act introduced by EGTRRA itself would have repealed the estate tax for one year (2010) and then readjusted it in 
2011 to the 2002 exemption level with a 2001 maximum rate. That is, had no further legislation been passed, the 
estate of a person who died in 2010 would have been entirely exempt from tax, while that of a person who died in 
2011 or later would have been taxed as heavily as it would have been in 2001. However, on December 17, 2010, 
Congress passed the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010. Section 
301 of the 2010 Act reinstated the federal estate tax, and the new law set the exemption for U.S. citizens and 
residents at $5 million per person and the maximum tax rate at 35 percent for 2011 and 2012. On January 1, 2013, 
the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012  permanently established an exemption of $5 million (with 2011 as the 
basis for inflation adjustment) per person for U.S. citizens and residents and a maximum tax rate of 40% after 2013. 
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In Equation (3), our variable of interest is   , associated with                     . If     , 
the relation between family ownership and subsequent innovation exists, with causality implications. 
Because we expect stronger family ownership since 2002, its effect on innovation, if any, is expected to 
be more pronounced because the strengthened family-relatedness due to the estate tax cut is expected to 
encourage innovation for the reasons suggested in Section 2. However, if the family-innovation relation is 
spurious, we should not observe statistical significance for   . Moreover, if an unobservable factor is 
driving both family ownership and innovation, then we should not observe a significantly positive    
unless this factor also strengthens in 2002. 
As displayed in Table 4, the coefficients on                      are positive and highly 
statistically significant. Panel A shows that the coefficient estimates of                       are 
10.5%, 22.6%, 7.4%, and 12.7% for Patenti,t+1, Citationi,t+1, Originalityi,t+1, and Generalityi,t+1, 
respectively. These estimates suggest that family firm innovation output has substantially increased 
(commensurate to the corresponding coefficients) since 2002. Panel B shows that the coefficient estimates 
of                       are 22.0%, 52.7%, 14.0%, and 27.3% for Patenti,t+1, Citationi,t+1, 
Originalityi,t+1, and Generalityi,t+1, respectively. Although the coefficients of           are not statistically 
significant, they are positive with the magnitude consistent with their counterparts in Table 2.  
These results suggest that given the same level of family ownership, firm innovation output has 
increased since 2002. This finding also supports a causal interpretation of the relation. Indeed, if the 
family-innovation relation is driven by unobservable factors and is not a causal relation, then we should 
not observe a pronounced relation since 2002.  
6. Economic Channels 
We now investigate the three channels (long-term commitment, financing, and corporate governance) 
through which family ownership positively stimulates innovation. 
6.1. Long-term commitment  
As argued in Section 2, family firms may be more innovative if their family-related shareholders are less 
myopic and more focused on long-term value. This hypothesis contradicts the alternative that family 
firms are overly conservative, which makes them more myopic. This effect should be particularly 
pronounced when other investors in the firm are more short-term oriented. We start by defining a proxy 
for the long-term investment horizon of the institutional investors. Following Gaspar, Massa, and Matos 
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(2005), we base this proxy on the turnover of institutional investors’ portfolio.22 The higher the turnover 
is, the shorter the horizon will be. We estimate the following specification:  
                                                                               
                                                                        
                                                                            
                                  ,           (4) 
where              denotes the percentage of outstanding equity owned by institutional investors of firm 
i in year t,                denotes a dummy that equals one if firm i’s turnover of institutional 
ownership in year t is in the bottom quartile (i.e., lowest turnover or longest horizon) and zero otherwise, 
               denotes a dummy that equals one if firm i’s turnover of institutional ownership in year t 
is in the middle two quartiles and zero otherwise, and                 denotes a dummy that equals one 
if firm i’s turnover of institutional ownership in year t is in the top quartile (i.e., highest turnover or 
shortest horizon) and zero otherwise.           denotes the family ownership dummy (percentage) in 
Panel A (B).             denotes all other control variables that are used in Equation (1). 
We interact the institutional ownership percentage with low, middle, and high turnover dummies: 
                        ,                            , and                             . 
We are interested in the coefficient estimates for   ,   ,   ,   ,   , and     We first expect that    >    > 
  ,     , and      because investor turnover decreases with the investor horizon, long-term investors 
promote innovation, and short-term investors discourages innovation by pursuing myopic goals and 
sacrificing long-term advantage. In addition, we expect that    > 0,     , and      if family 
ownership helps stabilize the ownership structure and stimulates innovation.
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 We expect the opposite 
results in the case of excessive conservatism.  
                                                 
22
 Investor-level portfolio information is obtained from the Factset database. We calculate a measure of how 
frequently each institutional investor rotates positions on all stocks included in the portfolio (churn rate). If we 
denote the set of companies held by investor i by Q, the churn rate of investor i at quarter t is  
      
∑                                             
∑
                         
    
  
where Pj,t and Nj,i,t represent the price and the number of shares, respectively, of company j held by institutional 
investor i at quarter t. S is the set of shareholders in company k, and wk,i,t is the weight of investor i of the total 
percentage held by institutional investors during quarter t. The investor turnover of firm k is the weighted average of 
the total portfolio churn rates of its investors over four quarters: 
                  ∑      (
 
 
∑         
 
   
)  
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 We do not hypothesize monotonic relations among   ,   , and    because we do not have any basis for 
determining the optimal combination of family and institutional ownership.   
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In Panel A of Table 5, we first note that the coefficients of                             are all 
significantly positive and that the coefficients of                              are all significantly 
negative. This finding is consistent with our proposition that the investor horizon matters in spurring 
innovation and provides support for the results obtained by Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales (2013). 
That is, the positive impact of institutional investors on innovation arises from institutional investors with 
long investment horizons. 
The coefficients of all interacted terms between the family firm dummy and institutional investors 
(i.e.,                                                                             , and 
                                      ) are positive, supporting the general positive effect of 
family ownership on innovation. Of the three, the impact of 
                                      is most highly significantly across all the specifications, 
suggesting that family ownership and long-term institutional ownership are particularly complementary in 
promoting innovation. In contrast, short-term institutional ownership (                            ) 
reduces innovation, but family ownership seems to offset this effect. Although this offsetting effect is not 
statistically significant, the coefficients of                                        are positive, 
ranging from 0.327 to 0.611. Panel B provides consistent results when we replace the family ownership 
dummy with the family ownership percentage. Overall, Table 5 supports the view that family ownership 
plays a role similar to that of long-term institutional ownership—as opposed to short-term institutional 
ownership—in promoting innovation. This result is consistent with the view that family ownership is 
associated with a long-term vision. 
To further illustrate this point, we consider another proxy for short-termism based on relative 
overvaluation measures developed by Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005). This proxy is 
based on the premise that when a stock is overvalued, a higher percentage of shareholders are 
momentum-based investors who tend to impose short-term pressure on firm managers and encourage 
myopic action (Bushee, 1998). We therefore interact family ownership with the degree of overvaluation 
of the stock. We estimate the following specification:  
                                                                                 
                                                                                     ,                                                                                                     
(5) 
where                denotes a dummy that equals one if firm i’s relative overvaluation gap is in the 
highest quartile in year t (i.e., most overvalued) and zero otherwise,               denotes a dummy that 
equals one if firm i’s relative overvaluation gap is in the middle two quartiles and zero otherwise, and 
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               denotes a dummy that equals one if firm i’s relative overvaluation gap is in the lowest 
quartile in year t (i.e., least overvalued) and zero otherwise. A detailed definition of the relative 
overvaluation gap is provided in the Appendix.           denotes the family ownership dummy 
(percentage) in Panel A (B).             denotes all other control variables that are used in Equation (1). 
We first expect that    >    and      because the short-term pressure from momentum-based 
investors discourages innovation to promote long-term value. In addition, we expect that           > 
0 if family ownership encourages innovation by protecting managers against the myopic preferences of 
shareholders with short investment horizons. In contrast, we expect the opposite results in the case of 
excessive conservatism.  
We report the results for Equation (5) in Table 6. Panel A indicates that although overvaluation 
negatively affects innovation (as the coefficients of                 range from -0.184 to -0.088 and are 
significantly negative), family ownership entirely offsets this adverse effect (as the coefficients of 
                          range from 0.105 to 0.231 and are significantly positive). Therefore, family 
ownership promotes innovation by guarding against short-term pressure from irrational investors. In 
particular, overvaluation among non-family firms could reduce the number of patents filed by an average 
of 21.1%, the number of patent citations by 25.2%, the originality of patents by 25.3%, and the generality 
of patents by 46.3%. By completely offsetting the negative impacts of momentum-based and myopic 
investors, family ownership significantly promotes innovation. Similar results are confirmed in Panel B 
when the family dummy is replaced by the family ownership percentage. 
Overall, Tables 5 and 6 support the argument that family ownership protects firms from myopic 
behavior and encourages them to pursue technological advantages. Moreover, these findings strengthen 
the causal interpretation of the family-innovation relation. If the positive relation between family 
ownership and innovation output were driven by an unobservable factor, then such a factor should also 
correlate with both investment horizons and overvaluation. Identifying a potential factor that satisfies all 
these criteria would be difficult. The only reasonable interpretation of the results presented in Tables 5 
and 6 is that family ownership promotes innovation and that this relation is more pronounced when firms 
are under short-term pressure from other shareholders.  
6.2. Relaxing financial constraints  
As we have argued in Section 2, family firms may be more innovative because lenders trust family firms. 
In contrast, to retain control, family firms may be less innovative because they are less willing to resort to 
capital markets and are therefore more financially constrained. This effect should be particularly 
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pronounced for more financially constrained firms. Therefore, to test these conflicting hypotheses 
empirically, we estimate the following specification:  
                                                                              
                                                           ,                                                                                 
(6) 
where          denotes a dummy that equals one if firm i’s financial constraint proxies in year t are in 
the top quartile (i.e., most financially constrained) and zero otherwise,         denotes a dummy that 
equals one if firm i’s financial constraint proxies in year t are in the middle two quartiles and zero 
otherwise, and          denotes a dummy that equals one if firm i’s financial constraint proxies in year t 
are in the bottom quartile (i.e., least financially constrained) and zero otherwise.           denotes the 
family ownership dummy (percentage) on the left (right) side of the table.             is a vector stacking 
all the other control variables as defined in Equation (1). 
We consider three proxies of financial constraints: the WW index developed by Whited and Wu 
(2005), the KZ index developed by Kaplan and Zingales (1997), and the SA index developed by Hadlock 
and Pierce (2010). The details of these indexes are provided in Appendix 1. More financially constrained 
firms have higher WW, KZ, and SA index values. 
Equation (6) allows us to investigate how family ownership affects innovation output under different 
financial constraints. We are interested in the coefficient estimates for   ,   ,   ,   , and     We expect 
that    < 0 because financial constraints harm overall output by reducing resource support and increasing 
uncertainty (e.g., Cohen, Levin, and Mowery, 1987; Aghion et al., 2010; Ciftci and Cready, 2011; Brown, 
Martinsson, and Petersen, 2012). In addition, we expect that      if more financially constrained firms 
benefit from family affiliation to a greater extent than other firms and the opposite otherwise.  
We report the results in Table 7, with the WW index in Panel A, the KZ index in Panel B, and the SA 
index in Panel C. The coefficients of           are significantly negative in most columns, and the 
coefficients of         are negative in all panels. The negative relation between the financial constraint 
proxies is consistent with previous research.  
In Panel A (based on the WW index), the coefficients on                     are positive and 
statistically significant. In addition, the coefficients on                    are all positive, and the 
coefficients on                    are all insignificant. Similar results are obtained in Panels B and C 
based on the KZ and SA indexes, respectively. These results strongly support the argument that family 
ownership reduces the negative effect of financial constraints on innovation. 
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These findings also strengthen the causal interpretation of the family-innovation relation. If family 
ownership and innovation output were driven by unobservable factors, then the reported pattern could 
only be explained by unobservable factors that also correlate with financial constraints. However, we 
cannot identify any potential factor that satisfies all these criteria. Thus, a reasonable interpretation of the 
results presented in Table 7 is that family ownership promotes innovation and that this relation is more 
pronounced when firms are financially constrained.  
6.3. Improving governance  
Finally, as we argued in Section 2, family firms may be more innovative because of better alignment 
between ownership and management. The alternative hypothesis is that family firms, being plagued by 
more agency costs and conflicts of interests among different classes of shareholders, are less innovative. 
This effect should be particularly pronounced for firms with lower quality governance. To test these 
hypotheses, we estimate the following specification:  
                                                                          
                                                      ,        (7) 
where                  (                  equals one if the governance proxies of firm i in year t 
are above (below) the median. We consider two governance proxies: the percentage of institutional 
investors, based on the premise that institutional investors are more active and professional in governing 
firms, and the entrenchment index (E index) developed by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009), as this 
index best captures the negative impact of managerial entrenchment on shareholder value. In Panel A of 
Table 8,                   and                  are defined as                and 
              , respectively, based on the percentage of institutional ownership. In Panel B of Table 8, 
                 and                 are defined as               and                  
respectively, based on the E index.           denotes the family ownership dummy (percentage) on the 
left (right) side of the table.             denotes all other control variables that are used in Equation (1). 
Panel A of Table 8 examines how family ownership influences innovation output through the 
governance channel based on the assumption that the appearance of institutional investors indicates better 
governance and encourages innovation, as indicate by Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales (2013). We 
argue that family ownership and institutional ownership are internal and external mechanisms, 
respectively, and that they are substitutes for each other. We include two interaction terms,           
                  and                           , in the regression to examine how family 
ownership affects innovation to different degrees conditional on the existence of external governance 
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mechanisms. We are mainly interested in the coefficient estimates for    and   , and we expect that    > 
  based on the substitutability argument that family ownership promotes innovation more given the 
absence of external governance mechanism.  
Panel A shows that the coefficients of                          are significantly positive in all 
the specifications. By contrast, the coefficients of                           are insignificant in all 
the specifications. These estimates suggest that in the absence or weak presence of institutional investors, 
family-owned firms produce stronger patent portfolios than non-family-owned firms. Panel B presents 
similar results, as the coefficients of                           are positive and statistically significant 
in all the specifications except the regressions of patents and citations on the family dummies.  
Overall, the results presented in Table 8 suggest that family ownership replaces other governance 
mechanisms in spurring innovation by lowering agency costs and strengthening monitoring, which 
supports a causal interpretation of the family-innovation relation.  
7. A Link to the Existing Body of Literature 
One influential conclusion of existing research is that the importance of family ties—such as the 
popularity of family firms in an economy—may arise due to a lack of social capital and institutions (e.g., 
Banfield, 1958; Putnam et al., 1993; Fukuyama, 1995; Mueller and Philippon, 2011), which hinders 
innovation (Coleman, 1988; Hall and Jones, 1999). Morck, Strangeland, and Yeung (2000), Villalonga 
and Amit (2006), and Anderson, Duru, and Reeb (2012) find that family firms spend less on R&D, 
although Miller and Le Breton-Miller (2005) suggest that family firms tend to invest more in long-run 
R&D. 
To reconcile our results with those of previous research, we first verify that family firms are indeed 
associated with less R&D. In Table 9, the first model regresses R&D on the family ownership dummy 
and illustrates that family ownership is significantly associated with lower R&D. Model (1) in Panel B 
shows that the fraction of family ownership is also generally associated with lower R&D; however, this 
relationship is not statistically significant. Overall, we confirm the findings of previous studies that family 
firms have lower R&D spending.  
Concluding that modern family firms face lower innovation incentives from this negative relationship 
would be, however, premature. To illustrate the impact of family firms on innovation, we scale our main 
patent variables by lagged R&D—i.e., we measure the realized efficiency of R&D outputs (e.g., Lanjouw 
and Schankerman, 2004; Cohen, Diether, and Malloy, 2013; Hirshleifer, Hsu, and Li, 2013)—and report 
the role of family firms in these scaled variables in the next four columns in each panel. The results are 
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reversed. The family firm dummy, for instance, is associated with 24% more patents filed per dollar 
invested in R&D, 25% more citations of filed patents per dollar invested in R&D, 25% greater originality 
and 28% greater generality, respectively, when scaled by R&D investment. Family firms, at least in the 
U.S. and during our sample period, achieve significant advantages in these efficiency variables.  
Because the EGTRRA test also implies that family firms in the U.S. generate more patents when 
estate taxes create incentives to innovate, we also explore whether family firms also became more 
efficient innovators during the same period. The results in Table 10 confirm an increase in innovation 
among family firms based on the same difference-in-difference test presented in Table 4 with R&D and 
R&D scaled patent outputs as the dependent variables. Specifically, we observe that R&D spending does 
not change drastically over time but that the outputs—in terms of the number of patents filed, number of 
citations, degree of originality, and degree of generality—are all improved. These observations suggest 
that family ownership more efficiently spurs innovation when the institutions allow family firms to retain 
more of the benefits of innovation.  
Table A14 in the Internet Appendix highlights the role of institutions. Panel A reveals that the impact 
of cross-county trust on firm-level innovation remains positive—although its statistical power decreases, 
typically no longer significant at the 10% level. The capitalist institutions of the modern U.S. economy 
appear to partially suppress the negative impact of distrust on innovation. In this case, although low levels 
of trust induce the formation of more family firms, as indicated by Model (1) in Panels B and C of the 
table, family ownership induced by low trust nonetheless promotes innovation.
24
 The results suggest that 
the family firm business structure may not present an obstacle to innovation. Rather, the characteristics of 
family firms may intertwine with the prevailing institutions of an economy—enhancing the beneficial 
impact of good institutions and magnifying the negative influence of detrimental institutions—to affect 
innovation.  
8. Conclusion 
Family firms account for a significant portion of business activities and constitute the backbone of 
economic development worldwide. Nevertheless, their link to innovation is less obvious. In theory, family 
ownership can promote innovation through several channels (e.g., by focusing on long-term value, 
alleviating financial constraints, or improving governance) but can hamper it as well (e.g., by following 
suboptimal investment policies due to conservatism and nepotism, having higher capital costs due to 
                                                 
24
 Because the t-statistics for the impact of trust on firm-level innovation is still approximately 1.5, trust is less 
exogenous as an instrument than the divorce rate. Hence, we rely on the divorce rate as our main instrument and 
report the trust-based results here to encourage future research.  
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under-diversification, or exacerbating agency issues). The lack of clear evidence on this topic is quite 
surprising given the popularity of family firms worldwide.  
In this paper, we utilize complete patent data for U.S. public firms for the period from 2000 to 2010 
to examine the impact of family ownership on innovation. We find strong empirical evidence that family-
owned firms produce more and higher quality patents. Specifically, family ownership is positively related 
to the number of firm-level patents as well as the influence, originality, and generality of these patents.  
This positive impact is confirmed by instrumental variable regressions and difference-in-difference 
tests. We find that the state-level divorce rate significantly reduces family ownership. Using this rate as an 
instrument, we verify that instrumented family ownership enhances both the quality and quantity of firm-
level patents. Difference-in-difference tests exploiting the federal estate tax cut ensuing from EGTRRA 
confirm the direction of the causal link from family ownership to innovation. The impact of family 
ownership on innovation results from a greater commitment to long-term value, reduced financial 
constraints, and improved corporate governance. Overall, our investigation illuminates the role of family 
firms in knowledge-based economies, and our findings may have significant normative implications for 
innovation policies. 
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
 
Variables Definition 
Patentt+1 Patentt+1 is defined as the logarithm of 1 plus the total number of successful patent 
applications (“patents” hereinafter) that are filed by firm i in year t+1 and that are 
approved by the USPTO from year t+1 to 2010. We use the logarithm of the patent 
count plus 1 to mitigate skewness in the firm-level patent counts. This measure reflects 
firm innovation performance from a quantitative perspective.  
 
Citationt+1 Citationt+1 is defined as the logarithm of 1 plus the total number of citations received by 
all patents that are filed by firm i in year t+1 and that are approved by the USPTO from 
year t+1 to 2010. For each patent filed by firm i in year t+1, we track the number of 
citations received by this patent from year t+1 to the end of 2010. We then sum up the 
citation numbers across all patents filed by firm i in year t+1 and obtain the number of 
citations. This measure is sometimes referred to as the citation-weighted patent count. 
We use the logarithmic citation count plus 1 to mitigate skewness in firm-level patents 
and citations. This measure reflects firm innovation performance from a qualitative 
perspective.  
 
Originalityt+1 Originalityt+1 is defined as the sum of originality scores of all patents filed by firm i in 
year t+1. Following Trajtenberg, Henderson, and Jaffe (1997), we define the originality 
score of an individual patent as one minus the Herfindahl index of the technology class 
distribution of all patents that have been cited by this particular patent. The USPTO 
assigns each patent to a three-digit technology class 
(http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/cbcby.htm). For example, if Patent E 
cites Patent A (assigned to Class X), Patent B (assigned to Class Y), and Patent C 
(assigned to Class Y), then Patent E’s originality score = 1 – [(1/3)2 + (2/3)2] = 0.444. 
After calculating each patent’s originality score, we sum up the originality scores of all 
patents that are filed by firm i in year t+1 to obtain firm i’s originality score in year t+1 
(Hsu, Tian, and Xu, 2014). This measure reflects a firm’s innovation performance in 
terms of its combined technologies and its deviation from existing technology 
trajectories.  
 
Generalityt+1 Generalityt+1 is defined as the sum of the generality scores of all patents filed by firm i 
in year t+1. Following Trajtenberg, Henderson, and Jaffe (1997), we define the 
generality score of an individual patent as one minus the Herfindahl index of the 
technology class distribution of all subsequent patents that cite this patent. For example, 
if Patent A is cited by Patent B (assigned to Class Y), Patent C (assigned to Class Y), 
Patent D (assigned to Class Z), and Patent F (assigned to Class X), then Patent A’s 
generality score = 1 – [(1/4)2 + (2/4)2 + (1/4)2] = 0.625. After calculating each patent’s 
generality score, we sum up the generality scores of all patents that are filed by firm i in 
year t+1 to obtain firm i’s generality score in year t+1 (Hsu, Tian, and Xu, 2014). This 
measure reflects firm-level innovation performance in terms of the application of its 
innovations to a wide range of technology classes.  
 
Family Dummy A dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm’s ultimate owner is a family and 
if the family ownership is at least 20% of the total voting rights (and zero otherwise). 
This variable is computed for each firm in each given year.  
 
Family Ownership The fraction of voting rights of a firm that is attributable to its ultimate family 
ownership. This variable is computed for each firm in each given year. 
 
Firm age Firm age is defined as the number of years being listed in three main stock exchanges 
(NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ). 
 
M/B M/B is defined as stock market capitalization divided by the book equity of firm i in 
year t. Stock market capitalization is defined as firm i’s stock price multiplied by the 
number of shares outstanding at the year end of year t. Book equity is defined as firm i’s 
common equity (CEQ) plus its deferred tax (TXDB). 
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% Own The percentage of institutional ownership is the total institutional ownership from 13f 
filings divided by the total number of shares outstanding. Ownership data are from the 
Thomson Reuters Institutional (13f) Holdings dataset. 
Own Concentration Institutional ownership concentration is calculated based on the Herfindahl Index of the 
share distribution of individual investors. It is defined as the sum of squared shares 
across all institutional investors; for institutional investor i, its share is defined as shares 
owned by institutional owner i divided by total institutional ownership in year t.  
Assets Assets is defined as the logarithm of firm i’s total assets (AT) in millions at the year end 
of year t.  
 
R&D R&D is defined as the logarithm of firm i’s R&D expenditures (XRD) in millions plus 
one at the year end of year t. 
 
Capital Intensity Capital intensity is defined as the logarithm of firm i’s total assets (AT) in millions 
divided by its number of employees (EMP) in thousands at the year end of year t. 
 
CAPEX CAPEX is defined as the logarithm of firm i’s capital expenditures (CAPX) in millions 
plus one at the year end of year t. 
 
Leverage Leverage is defined as firm i’s long-term debt (DLTT) plus current debt (DLC), divided 
by its total assets (AT) at the year end of year t. 
 
Profit Margin Profit margin is defined as firm i’s operating income (OIADP) divided by its total sales 
(SALE) at the year end of year t. 
 
WW index Whited and Wu (2006) exploit an Euler equation approach from a structural model of 
investment to create the WW index as a measure of financial constraints. Following 
Whited and Wu (2006), we compute the WW index according to the following formula: 
WW = –0.091*CF – 0.062*DIVPOS + 0.021*TLTD – 0.044*LNTA + 0.102*ISG – 
0.035*SG, where CF is the ratio of cash flow to total assets; DIVPOS is an indicator 
that takes the value of one if the firm pays cash dividends; TLTD is the ratio of the 
long-term debt to total assets; LNTA is the natural log of total assets; ISG is the firm’s 
three-digit SIC industry sales growth; and SG is the firm’s sales growth. All variables 
are deflated by the replacement cost of total assets as the sum of the replacement value 
of the capital stock plus the rest of the total assets. Whited (1992) details the 
computation of the replacement value of the capital stock. 
 
KZ index Lamont, Polk, and Saa-Requejo (2001) use the regression coefficients from Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997) to compute the KZ index as follows: KZ = −1.001909*CashFlow/PPE 
+ 0.2826389*Tobin’s Q + 3.139193*Debt/TotalCapital − 39.3678*Dividends/PPE − 
1.314759*Cash/PPE, where CashFlow/PPE is computed as (Item 18 + Item 14)/Item 8, 
Tobin’s Q is computed as (Item 6 + CRSP December Market Equity − Item 60 − Item 
74)/Item 6, Debt/TotalCapital is computed as (Item 9 + Item 34)/(Item 9 + Item 34 + 
Item 216), Dividends/PPE is computed as (Item 21 + Item 19)/Item 8, and Cash/PPE is 
computed as (Item 1/Item 8). Item numbers refer to Compustat annual data items as in 
the following: 1 (cash and short-term investments), 6 (liabilities and stockholders’ 
equity–total), 8 (property, plant, and equipment), 9 (long-term debt–total), 14 
(depreciation and amortization), 18 (income before extraordinary items), 19 (dividends–
preferred), 21 (dividends–common), 34 (debt in current liabilities), 60 (common equity–
total), 74 (deferred taxes), and 216 (stockholders’ equity–total). Data item 8 is lagged. 
A firm needs to have valid information on all of the above annual items to be able to 
have a KZ index. 
 
SA index Hadlock and Pierce (2010) show that both the WW index and the KZ index rely on 
endogenous ﬁnancial choices that may not have a straightforward relation to financial 
constraints. They create the SA index, which is a combination of firm age and asset 
size, to measure financial constraints. We use the SA index as a third proxy for financial 
constraints. Following Hadlock and Pierce (2010), the SA index is calculated as 
(−0.737*Assets + 0.043*Assets − 0.040*Age), where Assets is the natural log of 
inflation-adjusted book assets and is capped at (the natural log of) $4.5 billion and Age 
is the number of years that a firm is listed with a non-missing stock price on Compustat 
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and is capped at 37 years. 
 
Industry relative 
Valuation 
Relative valuation gap is estimated following Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and 
Viswanathan (2005). For each industry j and year t, we estimate a valuation model from 
the following industry-level regressions by using ten years of lagged data: logMijτ = a0jt 
+ a1jt logBijτ + a2jt log        
  + a3jtI(< 0) log        
  + a4jtLEVijτ + εijτ, where τ = 
t−10, …, t−1; i indexes firms, j indexes industries, and t indexes time. Mijt is the market 
value of equity, computed by multiplying the common stock price at fiscal year end 
(item 199) by common shares outstanding (item 25). Bijt is the book value of equity, 
constructed as stockholders’ equity (item 216) and balance sheet deferred taxes and 
investment tax credit (item 35) minus the book value of preferred stock (item 56). NI is 
net income (item 172). Because we estimate the regression in logs, we set negative 
values of net income to zero and include an indicator function for negative values of net 
income. LEVijt is the leverage ratio computed as the ratio of total long-term debt (item 
9) to total assets (item 6). A firm’s total relative valuation is the difference between 
actual valuation and predicted valuation from the above empirical model and the 
industry relative valuation of firm i in year t is three-digit SIC industry average of the 
firm’s total relative valuation (excluding firm i). 
Patentt+1/R&Dt This variable is the logarithm of one plus the total number of successful patent 
applications that are filed by firm i in year t+1 (see variable “Patentt+1” for more details) 
minus the logarithm of R&D in year t. This measure indicates the number of patent 
filings in year t+1 scaled by R&D expenditure in year t. 
Citationt+1/R&Dt This variable is the logarithm of one plus the total number of citations received by all 
patents that are filed by firm i in year t+1 (see variable “Citationt+1” for more details) 
minus the logarithm of R&D at year t. This measure indicates the number of patent 
citations in year t+1 scaled by R&D expenditure in year t. 
Originalityt+1/R&Dt This variable is the logarithm of originality measure (see variable “Originalityt+1” for 
more details) of firm i in year t+1 minus the logarithm of R&D at year t. This measure 
indicates the patent originality in year t+1 scaled by R&D expenditure in year t. 
Generalityt+1/R&Dt This variable is the logarithm of generality measure (see variable “Generalityt+1” for 
more details) of firm i in year t+1 minus the logarithm of R&D at year t. This measure 
indicates the patent generality in year t+1 scaled by R&D expenditure in year t. 
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Table 1 Summary Statistics 
 
The sample period ranges from 2000 to 2010. We exclude firms with sales < 100 m and a firm age less than or equal to 5 years. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at 1%. All other variables are defined in the Appendix. Panel A provides summary statistics. 
Panel B shows the univariate comparison of the control variables for family and non-family firms. Panel C shows the univariate 
comparison of the innovation measures for family firms and non-family firms based on propensity score matching. The construction 
of the propensity score matched sample is detailed in Table A1 of the Internet Appendix. 
 
Panel A Summary Statistics 
 
N Mean Median Std P25 P75 
Patent,t+1 17025 0.61 0.00 1.30 0.00 0.69 
Citation,t+1 17025 0.73 0.00 1.76 0.00 0.00 
Originality,t+1 17025 0.46 0.00 1.06 0.00 0.00 
Generality,t+1 17025 0.19 0.00 0.66 0.00 0.00 
Family Dummy 17025 0.11 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.00 
Family Ownership 17025 0.05 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.00 
Firm age 17025 24.74 18.00 18.29 11.00 34.00 
M/B 17025 2.56 1.82 2.56 1.14 3.02 
% Inst Own 17025 0.59 0.73 0.39 0.14 0.95 
Own Concentration 17025 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.06 
Asset 17025 6.97 6.77 1.60 5.77 7.97 
R&D 17025 1.57 0.00 2.11 0.00 3.25 
Capital Intensity 17025 5.56 5.52 1.15 4.82 6.27 
CAPEX 17025 3.65 3.53 1.88 2.30 4.93 
Leverage 17025 0.22 0.21 0.18 0.06 0.34 
Profit Margin 17025 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.04 0.14 
Panel B Univariate 
 
Non-family Family p-value 
   Firm age 25.36 19.59 0.00 
   M/B 2.61 2.13 0.00 
   % Inst Own 0.60 0.47 0.00 
   Own Concentration 0.04 0.09 0.00 
   Asset 7.06 6.23 0.00 
   R&D 1.67 0.68 0.00 
   Capital Intensity 5.60 5.23 0.00 
   CAPEX 3.75 2.85 0.00 
   Leverage 0.22 0.21 0.00 
   Profit Margin 0.09 0.08 0.00 
   Panel C Propensity Score Matched Sample 
 
Non-family Family p-value 
   Propensity Score 0.181 0.181 0.921 
          Patent,t+1 0.205 0.258 0.034 
   Citations,t+1 0.253 0.327 0.036 
   Originality,t+1 0.144 0.186 0.029 
   Generality,t+1 0.045 0.076 0.005      
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Table 2 Main Results 
 
The sample period ranges from 2000 to 2010. We estimate the following regression model:                          
      , where    is the industry fixed effect at 2-digit SIC level;    is 
the year fixed effect; X is a vector of control variables measured at t; and the innovation measures are patent count, patent citation count, patent originality, and patent generality measured at t+1. Panel 
A uses the family ownership dummy, and Panel B uses the family ownership percentage. All other variables are defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are presented beneath the coefficients within 
parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and are two-way clustered at the industry (2-digit SIC) and 
year level. 
 
Panel A Family Firm Dummy 
 
Panel B Family Ownership Percentage 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Patent,t+1 Citation,t+1 Originality,t+1 Generality,t+1 
 
VARIABLES Patent,t+1 Citation,t+1 Originality,t+1 Generality,t+1 
          
 
          
Family 0.070* 0.088* 0.065** 0.057*** 
 
% Family Own 0.148** 0.209** 0.132** 0.116*** 
 
(0.036) (0.046) (0.029) (0.021) 
  
(0.071) (0.092) (0.061) (0.044) 
Firm age 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 
 
Firm age 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
M/B 0.024*** 0.035*** 0.017*** 0.013** 
 
M/B 0.024*** 0.035*** 0.017*** 0.013** 
 
(0.008) (0.013) (0.005) (0.006) 
  
(0.008) (0.013) (0.005) (0.006) 
% Inst Own -0.002 0.014 -0.014 -0.022 
 
% Inst Own -0.003 0.013 -0.015 -0.024 
 
(0.041) (0.047) (0.031) (0.017) 
  
(0.041) (0.047) (0.031) (0.017) 
Own Concentration 0.507** 0.287 0.522*** 0.239*** 
 
Own Concentration 0.516** 0.292 0.533*** 0.248*** 
 
(0.198) (0.245) (0.172) (0.090) 
  
(0.204) (0.252) (0.175) (0.092) 
Asset 0.069** 0.057 0.065** 0.026 
 
Asset 0.070** 0.057 0.066** 0.026 
 
(0.032) (0.043) (0.028) (0.020) 
  
(0.032) (0.043) (0.028) (0.020) 
R&D 0.313*** 0.344*** 0.253*** 0.114*** 
 
R&D 0.313*** 0.344*** 0.253*** 0.114*** 
 
(0.060) (0.087) (0.052) (0.041) 
  
(0.060) (0.087) (0.052) (0.041) 
Capital Intensity 0.012 0.027 0.007 0.013 
 
Capital Intensity 0.012 0.027 0.007 0.013 
 
(0.030) (0.044) (0.027) (0.020) 
  
(0.030) (0.044) (0.027) (0.021) 
CAPEX 0.087*** 0.122*** 0.070** 0.049** 
 
CAPEX 0.087*** 0.122*** 0.070** 0.049** 
 
(0.032) (0.047) (0.028) (0.023) 
  
(0.032) (0.047) (0.028) (0.023) 
Leverage -0.261** -0.413*** -0.223** -0.180** 
 
Leverage -0.264** -0.416*** -0.226** -0.183** 
 
(0.117) (0.159) (0.101) (0.079) 
  
(0.117) (0.160) (0.101) (0.079) 
Profit Margin -0.199 -0.426 -0.096 -0.116 
 
Profit Margin -0.198 -0.426 -0.095 -0.115 
 
(0.260) (0.370) (0.210) (0.122) 
  
(0.260) (0.371) (0.211) (0.123) 
Constant -1.798*** -1.987*** -1.483*** -0.651*** 
 
Constant -1.799*** -1.988*** -1.483*** -0.651*** 
 
(0.386) (0.437) (0.343) (0.216) 
  
(0.387) (0.438) (0.343) (0.216) 
           Observations 17,025 17,025 17,025 17,025 
 
Observations 17,025 17,025 17,025 17,025 
R-squared 0.5171 0.4360 0.4932 0.3467 
 
R-squared 0.5171 0.4361 0.4932 0.3466 
SIC2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
SIC2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 3 Instrument Variable Regression − State Divorce Rate 
 
The sample period ranges from 2000 to 2010. We estimate the following instrumental variable regression model:                          
      , where the family firm dummy (family 
ownership percentage) is instrumented by the state-level divorce rate in 2000 in the first stage. Panel A reports results from using the family ownership dummy, and Panel B uses the family ownership 
percentage. Column 1 reports the first-stage regressions, and Columns 2-5 report the second-stage regressions. All other variables are defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are presented beneath the 
coefficients within parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and are two-way clustered at the industry 
(2-digit SIC) and year level. 
 
Panel A Family Firm Dummy 
 
Panel B Family Ownership Percentage 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Family Patent,t+1 Citation,t+1 Originality,t+1 Generality,t+1 
 
VARIABLES % Family Own Patent,t+1 Citation,t+1 Originality,t+1 Generality,t+1 
            
 
            
Family 
 
1.252*** 1.820*** 1.055*** 0.718*** 
 
% Family Own 
 
0.325*** 0.511*** 0.366** 0.468*** 
  
(0.204) (0.334) (0.194) (0.178) 
   
(0.118) (0.191) (0.158) (0.127) 
State Divorce -0.029* 
     
State Divorce -0.008*** 
    
 
(0.016) 
      
(0.003) 
    Firm age -0.007*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 
 
Firm age -0.000*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
  
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
M/B -0.050*** 0.034*** 0.048*** 0.026*** 0.018*** 
 
M/B -0.003*** 0.023*** 0.035*** 0.017*** 0.014*** 
 
(0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.004) 
  
(0.001) (0.006) (0.009) (0.004) (0.002) 
% Inst Own -0.258** 0.082* 0.137 0.056* 0.025 
 
% Inst Own -0.012* 0.018 0.027 0.008 -0.009 
 
(0.103) (0.047) (0.088) (0.032) (0.018) 
  
(0.006) (0.037) (0.048) (0.027) (0.012) 
Own Concentration 1.766*** -0.440** -1.099*** -0.270** -0.290*** 
 
Own Concentration 0.110*** 0.133 -0.173 0.156 -0.015 
 
(0.343) (0.175) (0.424) (0.135) (0.102) 
  
(0.043) (0.099) (0.145) (0.099) (0.090) 
Asset -0.106** 0.097*** 0.093** 0.090*** 0.040** 
 
Asset -0.009** 0.063** 0.054 0.060** 0.024*** 
 
(0.043) (0.035) (0.043) (0.032) (0.016) 
  
(0.004) (0.029) (0.039) (0.027) (0.007) 
R&D 
 
0.268*** 0.288*** 0.212*** 0.093*** 
 
R&D 
 
0.313*** 0.345*** 0.253*** 0.115*** 
  
(0.051) (0.060) (0.043) (0.025) 
   
(0.045) (0.056) (0.041) (0.003) 
Capital Intensity -0.086 0.037 0.060 0.029 0.026 
 
Capital Intensity -0.003 0.012 0.027 0.008 0.014** 
 
(0.053) (0.049) (0.073) (0.044) (0.035) 
  
(0.005) (0.045) (0.066) (0.040) (0.006) 
CAPEX -0.063** 0.089** 0.126* 0.072* 0.050* 
 
CAPEX -0.000 0.086* 0.121* 0.069* 0.048*** 
 
(0.030) (0.045) (0.068) (0.037) (0.028) 
  
(0.004) (0.046) (0.069) (0.038) (0.006) 
Leverage 0.043 -0.262 -0.401* -0.229 -0.176* 
 
Leverage -0.008 -0.245 -0.401 -0.207 -0.172*** 
 
(0.148) (0.183) (0.211) (0.158) (0.094) 
  
(0.019) (0.209) (0.250) (0.174) (0.027) 
Profit Margin 0.819*** -0.397 -0.702* -0.266 -0.222 
 
Profit Margin 0.006 -0.221 -0.445 -0.120 -0.135*** 
 
(0.184) (0.314) (0.374) (0.243) (0.144) 
  
(0.013) (0.329) (0.386) (0.254) (0.045) 
Constant -2.744*** -2.284*** -2.374*** -1.896** -0.828** 
 
Constant 0.136*** -1.889*** -1.931** -1.540** -0.652*** 
 
(0.345) (0.833) (0.868) (0.746) (0.396) 
  
(0.016) (0.723) (0.761) (0.631) (0.242) 
             Observations 17,025 17,025 17,025 17,025 17,025 
 
Observations 17,025 17,025 17,025 17,025 17,025 
SIC2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
SIC2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 4 Difference-in-Difference Regression 
 
The sample period ranges from 2000 to 2003. After2001 is a dummy that is equal to one if the year > 2001. Panel A reports results from using the family ownership dummy, and Panel B uses the family 
ownership percentage. All other variables are defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are presented beneath the coefficients within parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, 
and 1%, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and are two-way clustered at the industry (2-digit SIC) and year level. 
 
 
Panel A Family Firm Dummy 
 
Panel B Family Ownership Percentage 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Patent,t+1 Citation,t+1 Originality,t+1 Generality,t+1 
 
VARIABLES Patent,t+1 Citation,t+1 Originality,t+1 Generality,t+1 
          
 
          
Family*after2001 0.105* 0.226** 0.074** 0.127*** % Family Own*after2001 0.220* 0.527*** 0.140* 0.273*** 
 (0.056) (0.104) (0.033) (0.034)   (0.130) (0.193) (0.076) (0.062) 
Family 0.039 -0.002 0.057 0.018 
 
% Family Own 0.093 -0.003 0.134 0.031 
 
(0.062) (0.119) (0.051) (0.048) 
  
(0.138) (0.241) (0.111) (0.107) 
Firm age 0.005*** 0.005* 0.004** 0.002 
 
Firm age 0.005*** 0.005* 0.004** 0.002 
 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) 
  
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
M/B 0.021** 0.034** 0.013** 0.009 
 
M/B 0.021** 0.034** 0.013* 0.009 
 
(0.009) (0.016) (0.006) (0.007) 
  
(0.009) (0.016) (0.007) (0.007) 
% Inst Own -0.029 -0.018 -0.036 -0.082* 
 
% Inst Own -0.031 -0.019 -0.039 -0.084* 
 
(0.070) (0.093) (0.057) (0.045) 
  
(0.071) (0.093) (0.056) (0.045) 
Own Concentration 0.294** 0.027 0.395*** 0.410*** 
 
Own Concentration 0.304* 0.037 0.412*** 0.423*** 
 
(0.146) (0.274) (0.120) (0.097) 
  
(0.157) (0.293) (0.126) (0.099) 
Asset 0.125*** 0.145** 0.122*** 0.091** 
 
Asset 0.125*** 0.145** 0.122*** 0.091** 
 
(0.043) (0.066) (0.037) (0.038) 
  
(0.043) (0.067) (0.038) (0.038) 
R&D 0.445*** 0.619*** 0.376*** 0.272*** 
 
R&D 0.444*** 0.619*** 0.376*** 0.272*** 
 
(0.042) (0.063) (0.038) (0.045) 
  
(0.042) (0.063) (0.038) (0.045) 
Capital Intensity 0.003 0.014 -0.003 -0.007 
 
Capital Intensity 0.003 0.014 -0.003 -0.007 
 
(0.040) (0.060) (0.036) (0.033) 
  
(0.040) (0.060) (0.036) (0.033) 
CAPEX 0.062* 0.094 0.048 0.051 
 
CAPEX 0.062* 0.093 0.048 0.050 
 
(0.035) (0.060) (0.029) (0.032) 
  
(0.035) (0.060) (0.031) (0.032) 
Leverage -0.279** -0.496** -0.241** -0.213* 
 
Leverage -0.282** -0.499** -0.243* -0.215* 
 
(0.137) (0.207) (0.118) (0.113) 
  
(0.139) (0.210) (0.128) (0.114) 
Profit Margin 0.124 -0.002 0.199 0.183 
 
Profit Margin 0.125 -0.001 0.206 0.184 
 
(0.309) (0.592) (0.294) (0.269) 
  
(0.309) (0.593) (0.284) (0.270) 
Constant -1.111*** -1.479*** -0.927*** -0.772*** 
 
Constant -1.109*** -1.481*** -0.973*** -0.766*** 
 
(0.227) (0.376) (0.208) (0.225) 
  
(0.230) (0.377) (0.208) (0.227) 
           Observations 6,316 6,316 6,316 6,316 
 
Observations 6,316 6,316 6,316 6,316 
R-squared 0.6252 0.5900 0.6087 0.5523 
 
R-squared 0.6252 0.5901 0.6086 0.5522 
SIC2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
SIC2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 5 Family Ownership and Investor Horizon 
 
The sample period ranges from 2000 to 2010. Inst Owner is the percentage of outstanding equity owned by institutional investors. Turnover is constructed following Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2005). 
Low (High) Turnover is a dummy equal to one if turnover is in the lowest (highest) quartile in year t. Mid Turnover is a dummy equal to one if turnover is in the middle two quartiles in year t. Panel A 
reports results from using the family ownership dummy, and Panel B uses the family ownership percentage. The regressions contain all the control variables and fixed effects included in Table 2 as well 
as Mid Turnover and High Turnover dummies. All other variables are defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are presented beneath the coefficients within parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and are two-way clustered at the industry (2-digit SIC) and year level. 
 
Panel A Family Firm Dummy 
 
Panel B Family Ownership Percentage 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Patent,t+1 
Citation, 
t+1 
Originality, 
t+1 
Generality, 
t+1 
 
VARIABLES Patent,t+1 
Citation, 
t+1 
Originality, 
t+1 
Generality, 
t+1 
          
 
          
Family*Inst Owner*Low  2.003*** 2.728*** 1.666*** 0.892*** 
 
% Family Own*Inst Owner*Low  3.191*** 4.513*** 2.638*** 1.432** 
Turnover (0.549) (0.818) (0.460) (0.337) Turnover (0.978) (1.483) (0.841) (0.592) 
Family*Inst Owner*Mid  0.564 0.954** 0.566** 0.619** 
 
% Family Own*Inst Owner*Mid  1.409** 2.215** 1.340** 1.259** 
Turnover (0.357) (0.430) (0.283) (0.250) 
 
Turnover (0.710) (0.922) (0.555) (0.491) 
Family*Inst Owner*High  0.327 0.611 0.351 0.544* 
 
% Family Own*Inst Owner*High  -0.075 0.510 0.129 0.948 
Turnover (0.960) (1.207) (0.755) (0.315) 
 
Turnover (1.957) (2.532) (1.564) (0.662) 
Inst Owner*Low Turnover 0.915*** 1.155*** 0.783*** 0.425*** 
 
Inst Owner*Low Turnover 0.954*** 1.204*** 0.817*** 0.442*** 
 
(0.255) (0.371) (0.222) (0.147) 
  
(0.254) (0.377) (0.228) (0.152) 
Inst Owner*Mid Turnover -0.209 -0.327 -0.195 -0.186 
 
Inst Owner*Mid Turnover -0.224 -0.346 -0.208 -0.191 
 
(0.204) (0.280) (0.171) (0.121) 
  
(0.197) (0.274) (0.166) (0.121) 
Inst Owner*High Turnover -2.527*** -4.189*** -2.427*** -2.078*** 
 
Inst Owner*High Turnover -2.511*** -4.172*** -2.414*** -2.071*** 
 
(0.954) (1.232) (0.817) (0.637) 
  
(0.959) (1.234) (0.821) (0.638) 
           
Observations 17,025 17,025 17,025 17,025 
 
Observations 17,025 17,025 17,025 17,025 
R-squared 0.5223 0.4428 0.4998 0.3572 
 
R-squared 0.5223 0.4429 0.4999 0.3572 
SIC2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
SIC2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 6 Family Ownership and Over-valuation Gap 
 
The sample period ranges from 2000 to 2010. The relative valuation gap is estimated following Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005). For each industry j and year t, we estimate a valuation 
model from the following industry-level regressions by using ten years of lagged data: logMijτ = a0jt + a1jt logBijτ + a2jt log        
 + a3jtI(< 0) log        
  + a4jtLEVijτ + εijτ, where τ = t−10, …, t−1; i indexes 
firms, j indexes industries, and t indexes time. Mijt is the market value of equity, computed by multiplying the common stock price at fiscal year end (item 199) by common shares outstanding (item 25). 
Bijt is the book value of equity, constructed as stockholders’ equity (item 216) and balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit (item 35) minus the book value of preferred stock (item 56). NI 
is net income (item 172). Because we estimate the regression in logs, we set negative values of net income to zero and include an indicator function for negative values of net income. LEVijt is the 
leverage ratio computed as the ratio of total long-term debt (item 9) to total assets (item 6). A firm’s total relative valuation is the difference between the actual valuation and the predicted valuation from 
the above empirical model, and the industry relative valuation of firm i in year t is the three-digit SIC industry average of firm’s total relative valuation (excluding firm i). Low (High) RelVal is a 
dummy equal to one if the industry relative valuation of firm i is in the lowest (highest) quartile in year t. Mid RelVal is a dummy equal to one if industry relative valuation of firm i is in the middle two 
quartiles. Panel A reports results from using the family ownership dummy, and Panel B uses the family ownership percentage. The regressions contain all the control variables and fixed effects included 
in Table 2 as well as Mid RelVal and High RelVal dummies. All other variables are defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are presented beneath the coefficients within parentheses. *, **, and *** 
denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and are two-way clustered at the industry (2-digit SIC) and year level. 
 
Panel A Family Firm Dummy 
 
Panel B Family Ownership Percentage 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Patent,t+1 Citation,t+1 Originality,t+1 Generality,t+1 
 
VARIABLES Patent,t+1 Citation,t+1 Originality,t+1 Generality,t+1 
          
 
          
Family*High RelVal 0.148** 0.231*** 0.142*** 0.105*** 
 
% Family Own*High RelVal 0.315** 0.480*** 0.302*** 0.216*** 
 
(0.060) (0.080) (0.047) (0.036) 
  
(0.134) (0.173) (0.101) (0.083) 
Family*Mid RelVal 0.007 0.027 0.002 0.026 
 
% Family Own*Mid RelVal 0.023 0.067 0.011 0.046 
 
(0.053) (0.072) (0.046) (0.025) 
  
(0.104) (0.137) (0.092) (0.047) 
Family*Low RelVal 0.047 0.023 0.050 0.030 
 
% Family Own*Low RelVal 0.138 0.137 0.126 0.077 
 
(0.093) (0.127) (0.070) (0.034) 
  
(0.158) (0.212) (0.119) (0.063) 
High RelVal -0.129* -0.184* -0.116* -0.088** 
 
High RelVal -0.126* -0.176* -0.114* -0.086** 
 
(0.067) (0.102) (0.061) (0.045) 
  
(0.065) (0.098) (0.059) (0.044) 
Mid RelVal 0.034 0.013 0.033 0.010 
 
Mid RelVal 0.035 0.017 0.033 0.010 
 
(0.048) (0.072) (0.037) (0.025) 
  
(0.047) (0.070) (0.036) (0.025) 
           
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 16,660 16,661 16,663 16,663 
 
Observations 16,660 16,661 16,663 16,663 
R-squared 0.4854 0.4030 0.4619 0.3067 
 
R-squared 0.4854 0.4030 0.4620 0.3066 
SIC2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
SIC2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 7 Family Ownership and Financial Constraints 
 
The sample period ranges from 2000 to 2010. The WW Index is constructed following Whited and Wu (2005). The KZ Index is constructed following Kaplan and Zingales (1997). The SA Index is 
constructed following Hadlock and Pierce (2010). For each year, firms are assigned into quartiles based on their respective financial constraint index. High WW (KZ/SA) is a dummy equal to one if a 
firm is assigned to top quartile in year t. Low WW (KZ/SA) is a dummy equal to one if a firm is assigned to bottom quartile in year t. Mid WW (KZ/SA) is a dummy equal to one if a firm is assigned to 
middle two quartiles in year t. Panels A and B contain all the control variables and fixed effects included in Table 2. Panel C contains the control variables and fixed effects included in Table 2 except 
for firm age and firm size. All other variables are defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are presented beneath the coefficients within parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, 
and 1%, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and are two-way clustered at the industry (2-digit SIC) and year level. 
 
Panel A WW Index 
Panel I Family Firm Dummy 
 
Panel II Family Ownership Percentage 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Patent,t+1 Citation,t+1 Originality,t+1 Generality,t+1 
 
VARIABLES Patent,t+1 Citation,t+1 Originality,t+1 Generality,t+1 
          
 
          
Family*High WW 0.037** 0.039* 0.031** 0.018* 
 
% Family Own*High WW 0.061** 0.073* 0.050** 0.034* 
 
(0.015) (0.022) (0.013) (0.011) 
  
(0.030) (0.043) (0.025) (0.021) 
Family*Mid WW 0.005 0.009 0.009 0.012** 
 
% Family Own*Mid WW 0.018 0.026 0.022 0.026** 
 
(0.011) (0.015) (0.008) (0.005) 
  
(0.019) (0.026) (0.015) (0.010) 
Family*Low WW 0.026 0.041 0.017 0.016 
 
% Family Own*Low WW 0.074 0.130 0.046 0.035 
 
(0.044) (0.054) (0.036) (0.023) 
  
(0.087) (0.101) (0.070) (0.038) 
High WW -0.182** -0.230** -0.165** -0.079 
 
High WW -0.176** -0.224** -0.161** -0.078 
 
(0.084) (0.104) (0.076) (0.049) 
  
(0.083) (0.103) (0.074) (0.048) 
Mid WW -0.025 -0.029 -0.038 -0.028 
 
Mid WW -0.026 -0.028 -0.039 -0.029 
 
(0.069) (0.076) (0.061) (0.039) 
  
(0.068) (0.074) (0.060) (0.039) 
           Control Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 16,966 16,966 16,966 16,966 
 
Observations 16,966 16,966 16,966 16,966 
R-squared 0.5180 0.4373 0.4942 0.3468  R-squared 0.5179 0.4374 0.4940 0.3468 
 
Panel B KZ Index 
Panel I Family Firm Dummy 
 
Panel II Family Ownership Percentage 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Patent,t+1 Citation,t+1 Originality,t+1 Generality,t+1 
 
VARIABLES Patent,t+1 Citation,t+1 Originality,t+1 Generality,t+1 
          
 
          
Family*High KZ 0.027*** 0.036*** 0.025*** 0.023*** 
 
% Family Own*High KZ 0.054** 0.075*** 0.050** 0.042** 
 
(0.008) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008) 
  
(0.021) (0.028) (0.019) (0.017) 
Family*Mid KZ 0.007 0.009 0.009 0.013** 
 
% Family Own*Mid KZ 0.014 0.028 0.018 0.028** 
 
(0.013) (0.017) (0.010) (0.006) 
  
(0.034) (0.040) (0.025) (0.012) 
Family*Low KZ 0.020 0.023 0.016 0.006 
 
% Family Own*Low KZ 0.038 0.050 0.027 0.013 
 
(0.017) (0.021) (0.013) (0.007) 
  
(0.043) (0.052) (0.029) (0.016) 
High KZ -0.173** -0.207** -0.117* -0.022 
 
High KZ -0.173*** -0.206*** -0.117** -0.020 
 
(0.076) (0.101) (0.060) (0.036) 
  
(0.058) (0.040) (0.044) (0.020) 
Mid KZ -0.150*** -0.195*** -0.114*** -0.058*** 
 
Mid KZ -0.151*** -0.196*** -0.115*** -0.057*** 
 
(0.046) (0.050) (0.037) (0.020) 
  
(0.037) (0.024) (0.029) (0.009) 
           Control Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 16,923 16,923 16,923 16,923 
 
Observations 16,923 16,923 16,923 16,923 
R-squared 0.5177 0.4372 0.4936 0.3473 
 
R-squared 0.5177 0.4372 0.4935 0.3472 
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Panel C SA Index 
Panel I Family Firm Dummy 
 
Panel II Family Ownership Percentage 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Patent,t+1 Citation,t+1 Originality,t+1 Generality,t+1 
 
VARIABLES Patent,t+1 Citation,t+1 Originality,t+1 Generality,t+1 
          
 
          
Family*High SA 0.039** 0.053** 0.032** 0.023** 
 
% Family Own*High SA 0.067* 0.097** 0.057* 0.042** 
 
(0.018) (0.023) (0.015) (0.010) 
  
(0.037) (0.047) (0.031) (0.019) 
Family*Mid SA 0.014 0.014 0.015* 0.013** 
 
% Family Own*Mid SA 0.031 0.040 0.030 0.026** 
 
(0.012) (0.015) (0.009) (0.006) 
  
(0.024) (0.031) (0.019) (0.013) 
Family*Low SA -0.038 -0.038 -0.032 -0.008 
 
% Family Own*Low SA -0.070 -0.073 -0.063 -0.016 
 
(0.036) (0.047) (0.031) (0.021) 
  
(0.070) (0.084) (0.060) (0.033) 
High SA -0.178*** -0.206*** -0.138*** -0.066*** 
 
High SA -0.172*** -0.199*** -0.133*** -0.064*** 
 
(0.043) (0.060) (0.035) (0.024) 
  
(0.042) (0.057) (0.035) (0.023) 
Mid SA -0.191*** -0.207*** -0.161*** -0.085*** 
 
Mid SA -0.189*** -0.207*** -0.159*** -0.084*** 
 
(0.046) (0.052) (0.039) (0.029) 
  
(0.045) (0.051) (0.039) (0.028) 
           Control Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 17,025 17,025 17,025 17,025 
 
Observations 17,025 17,025 17,025 17,025 
R-squared 0.5144 0.4351 0.4898 0.3448 
 
R-squared 0.5142 0.4350 0.4896 0.3446 
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Table 8 Family Ownership and External Governance 
 
The sample period ranges from 2000 to 2010. High (Low) Own is a dummy equal to one if the sample firm’s percentage of outstanding equity owned by institutional investors is above (below) the 
median in year t. High (Low) E index is a dummy equal to one if the E index is above (below) the median in year t, where E index is obtained from Lucian Bebchuk’s website. Panel A splits the sample 
by institutional ownership, and Panel B splits the sample by the E Index. The left panels use the family ownership dummy, and the right panels use the family ownership percentage. The regressions 
contain all the control variables and fixed effects included in Table 2. All other variables are defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are presented beneath the coefficients within parentheses. *, **, and 
*** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and are two-way clustered at the industry (2-digit SIC) and year level. 
 
Panel A Institutional Ownership 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Patent,t+1 Citation,t+1 Originality,t+1 Generality,t+1 
 
VARIABLES Patent,t+1 Citation,t+1 Originality,t+1 Generality,t+1 
          
 
          
Family*High Inst Own -0.056 -0.078 -0.029 0.013 
 
Family %*High Inst Own -0.085 -0.097 -0.039 0.052 
 
(0.074) (0.095) (0.057) (0.028) 
  
(0.131) (0.163) (0.102) (0.050) 
Family*Low Inst Own 0.147*** 0.190*** 0.123*** 0.084** 
 
Family %*Low Inst Own 0.303*** 0.412*** 0.246*** 0.160** 
 
(0.050) (0.065) (0.042) (0.033) 
  
(0.100) (0.128) (0.085) (0.063) 
High Inst Own 0.026 0.042 0.011 -0.004 
 
High Inst Own 0.021 0.037 0.007 -0.008 
 
(0.028) (0.035) (0.022) (0.014) 
  
(0.028) (0.034) (0.022) (0.014) 
           Control Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 17,025 17,025 17,025 17,025 
 
Observations 17,025 17,025 17,025 17,025 
R-squared 0.5176 0.4365 0.4936 0.3468 
 
R-squared 0.5175 0.4365 0.4936 0.3467 
Panel B Entrenchment Index 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Patent,t+1 Citation,t+1 Originality,t+1 Generality,t+1 
 
VARIABLES Patent,t+1 Citation,t+1 Originality,t+1 Generality,t+1 
          
 
          
Family*High E Index 0.202 0.218 0.190* 0.134* 
 
Family %*High E Index 0.706** 0.853** 0.609** 0.386** 
 
(0.151) (0.223) (0.112) (0.077) 
  
(0.296) (0.423) (0.259) (0.196) 
Family*Low E Index -0.008 -0.040 0.003 0.028 
 
Family %*Low E Index -0.045 -0.066 -0.026 0.053 
 
(0.071) (0.094) (0.056) (0.030) 
  
(0.149) (0.192) (0.121) (0.063) 
High E Index -0.119** -0.126 -0.092* -0.034 
 
High E Index -0.121** -0.127* -0.094** -0.034 
 
(0.054) (0.077) (0.047) (0.027) 
  
(0.054) (0.076) (0.047) (0.027) 
           Control Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 10,683 10,683 10,683 10,683 
 
Observations 10,683 10,683 10,683 10,683 
R-squared 0.5479 0.4759 0.5247 0.3885  R-squared 0.5480 0.4760 0.5248 0.3885 
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Table 9 Family Ownership and Innovation Efficiency 
 
The sample period ranges from 2000 to 2010. We estimate the following regression model:                          
      , where    is the industry fixed effect at the 2-digit SIC level; 
   is the year fixed effect; X is a vector of control variables measured at t. Panel A uses the family ownership dummy, and Panel B uses the family ownership percentage. All other variables are defined 
in the Appendix. Standard errors are presented beneath the coefficients within parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and are two-way clustered at the industry (2-digit SIC) and year level. 
 
Panel A Family Firm Dummy 
 
Panel B Family Ownership Percentage 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES R&D,t+1 
Patent,t+1 
/R&D,t 
Citation, 
t+1 
/R&D,t 
Originality, 
t+1 
/R&D,t 
Generality, 
t+1 
/R&D,t 
 
VARIABLES R&D,t+1 
Patent,t+1 
/R&D,t 
Citation, 
t+1 
/R&D,t 
Originality, 
t+1 
/R&D,t 
Generality, 
t+1 
/R&D,t 
            
 
            
Family -0.262** 0.242*** 0.253*** 0.253*** 0.279*** 
 
% Family Own -0.365 0.386* 0.436** 0.391* 0.423* 
 
(0.106) (0.092) (0.093) (0.095) (0.101) 
  
(0.248) (0.210) (0.209) (0.217) (0.232) 
Firm age 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.001 
 
Firm age 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
  
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
M/B 0.118*** -0.054*** -0.040** -0.068*** -0.087*** 
 
M/B 0.118*** -0.054*** -0.040** -0.068*** -0.087*** 
 
(0.010) (0.009) (0.017) (0.009) (0.011) 
  
(0.010) (0.009) (0.017) (0.008) (0.011) 
% Inst Own -0.105 0.086 0.098 0.082 0.091 
 
% Inst Own -0.095 0.079 0.091 0.074 0.082 
 
(0.079) (0.062) (0.062) (0.063) (0.073) 
  
(0.078) (0.061) (0.061) (0.062) (0.072) 
Own Concentration 0.040 0.420 0.204 0.429 0.128 
 
Own Concentration -0.055 0.493* 0.270 0.509* 0.219 
 
(0.355) (0.278) (0.268) (0.297) (0.320) 
  
(0.356) (0.285) (0.276) (0.302) (0.320) 
Asset 0.433*** -0.228*** -0.228** -0.258*** -0.358*** 
 
Asset 0.433*** -0.229*** -0.228** -0.259*** -0.359*** 
 
(0.104) (0.080) (0.094) (0.086) (0.101) 
  
(0.104) (0.080) (0.094) (0.086) (0.101) 
Capital Intensity 0.336*** -0.218*** -0.193** -0.243*** -0.284*** 
 
Capital Intensity 0.337*** -0.219*** -0.194** -0.244*** -0.285*** 
 
(0.116) (0.083) (0.085) (0.090) (0.103) 
  
(0.117) (0.084) (0.086) (0.090) (0.104) 
CAPEX -0.005 0.086** 0.121*** 0.069* 0.048 
 
CAPEX -0.005 0.085** 0.121*** 0.068* 0.047 
 
(0.055) (0.039) (0.045) (0.040) (0.043) 
  
(0.055) (0.039) (0.045) (0.040) (0.043) 
Leverage -1.505*** 0.753** 0.554 0.879*** 1.126*** 
 
Leverage -1.494*** 0.743** 0.545 0.869*** 1.115*** 
 
(0.355) (0.309) (0.358) (0.312) (0.339) 
  
(0.353) (0.307) (0.356) (0.310) (0.337) 
Profit Margin -1.240*** 0.820* 0.547 1.012** 1.198*** 
 
Profit Margin -1.252*** 0.830* 0.555 1.023** 1.210*** 
 
(0.366) (0.450) (0.518) (0.431) (0.391) 
  
(0.368) (0.452) (0.520) (0.434) (0.394) 
Constant -4.565*** 1.354** 1.021 1.944*** 3.412*** 
 
Constant -4.576*** 1.362** 1.028 1.952*** 3.422*** 
 
(0.836) (0.526) (0.692) (0.563) (0.736) 
  
(0.838) (0.529) (0.695) (0.566) (0.739) 
             Observations 17,025 17,025 17,025 17,025 17,025 
 
Observations 17,025 17,025 17,025 17,025 17,025 
R-squared 0.6106 0.3879 0.3046 0.4554 0.5476 
 
R-squared 0.6099 0.3872 0.3041 0.4546 0.5467 
SIC2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
SIC2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 10 Family Ownership and Innovation Efficiency: Difference-in-Difference 
 
The sample period ranges from 2000 to 2003. After2001 is a dummy equal to one if the year > 2001. Panel A reports results from using the family ownership dummy, and Panel B uses the family 
ownership percentage. All other variables are defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are presented beneath the coefficients within parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, 
and 1%, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and are two-way clustered at the industry (2-digit SIC) and year level. 
 
Panel A Family Firm Dummy 
 
Panel B Family Ownership Percentage 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES R&D,t+1 
Patent,t+1 
/R&D,t 
Citation, 
t+1 
/R&D,t 
Originality, 
t+1 
/R&D,t 
Generality, 
t+1 
/R&D,t 
 
VARIABLES R&D,t+1 
Patent,t+1 
/R&D,t 
Citation, 
t+1 
/R&D,t 
Originality, 
t+1 
/R&D,t 
Generality, 
t+1 
/R&D,t 
            
 
            
Family -0.151 0.125 0.057 0.157 0.131 
 
% Family Own -0.174 0.192 0.064 0.245 0.160 
 
(0.107) (0.111) (0.136) (0.106) (0.113) 
  
(0.224) (0.255) (0.302) (0.213) (0.255) 
Family*after2001 -0.024 0.125* 0.239** 0.089** 0.153*** 
 
% Family Own*after2001 -0.106 0.297* 0.580*** 0.226*** 0.374*** 
 
(0.054) (0.064) (0.101) (0.041) (0.043) 
  
(0.130) (0.168) (0.205) (0.081) (0.114) 
Firm age 0.008*** -0.000 0.002 -0.002 -0.004* 
 
Firm age 0.008*** -0.000 0.002 -0.002 -0.004* 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
  
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
M/B 0.125*** -0.046*** -0.012 -0.063*** -0.079*** 
 
M/B 0.125*** -0.046*** -0.012 -0.063*** -0.079*** 
 
(0.017) (0.009) (0.015) (0.011) (0.013) 
  
(0.017) (0.009) (0.015) (0.011) (0.012) 
% Inst Own -0.040 -0.003 -0.000 -0.008 -0.048 
 
% Inst Own -0.034 -0.008 -0.004 -0.013 -0.054 
 
(0.084) (0.077) (0.093) (0.072) (0.071) 
  
(0.083) (0.076) (0.094) (0.073) (0.072) 
Own Concentration -0.039 0.265 0.007 0.368 0.372 
 
Own Concentration -0.096 0.308 0.039 0.416* 0.428 
 
(0.403) (0.212) (0.265) (0.255) (0.292) 
  
(0.392) (0.216) (0.280) (0.252) (0.288) 
Asset 0.309*** -0.045 0.029 -0.069 -0.131* 
 
Asset 0.310*** -0.045 0.029 -0.069 -0.132* 
 
(0.104) (0.059) (0.071) (0.063) (0.079) 
  
(0.103) (0.060) (0.072) (0.063) (0.079) 
Capital Intensity 0.336*** -0.185** -0.115 -0.214** -0.253*** 
 
Capital Intensity 0.336*** -0.185** -0.115 -0.214** -0.253*** 
 
(0.113) (0.083) (0.075) (0.089) (0.097) 
  
(0.113) (0.082) (0.076) (0.087) (0.097) 
CAPEX 0.083 0.010 0.058 -0.010 -0.018 
 
CAPEX 0.084 0.009 0.057 -0.011 -0.018 
 
(0.057) (0.040) (0.057) (0.041) (0.043) 
  
(0.057) (0.042) (0.059) (0.043) (0.044) 
Leverage -1.334*** 0.446* 0.002 0.576** 0.739** 
 
Leverage -1.327*** 0.440* -0.004 0.569** 0.731** 
 
(0.348) (0.264) (0.272) (0.273) (0.305) 
  
(0.343) (0.265) (0.282) (0.275) (0.300) 
Profit Margin -1.551*** 1.175** 0.719 1.385*** 1.560*** 
 
Profit Margin -1.561*** 1.182** 0.724 1.394*** 1.569*** 
 
(0.435) (0.465) (0.659) (0.453) (0.469) 
  
(0.419) (0.479) (0.662) (0.480) (0.471) 
Constant -3.203*** 0.597** -0.330 0.900*** 1.336*** 
 
Constant -3.665*** 0.902*** -0.102 1.286*** 1.869*** 
 
(0.629) (0.284) (0.298) (0.297) (0.508) 
  
(0.533) (0.291) (0.432) (0.291) (0.449) 
             Observations 6,316 6,316 6,316 6,316 6,316 
 
Observations 6,316 6,316 6,316 6,316 6,316 
R-squared 0.6293 0.2521 0.0987 0.3625 0.4880 
 
R-squared 0.6290 0.2517 0.0987 0.3620 0.4875 
SIC2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
SIC2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Internet Appendix 
  
The New Lyrics of the Old Folks:  
The Role of Family Ownership in Corporate Innovation 
 
 
This Internet Appendix consists of four sets of robustness checks (Tables A1 to A12) for the 
main results reported in Table 2. Table A13 provides tests of the exclusion restriction of our 
instrument. Table A14 analyzes the role of social trust in the family-innovation relation. 
We first conduct two robustness checks to demonstrate that our results in Table 2 are 
unaffected by the skewed distribution of family firms in the economy or their definitions. To 
address the potential econometric issues related to the lower number of family firms relative to 
non-family firms in the U.S., Table A1 of the Internet Appendix creates propensity score matched 
samples for family and non-family firms. Propensity scores are created based on all the 
characteristics tabulated in Panel B of Table 1. We then select, for each family firm, a non-family 
firm that most closely resembles it to provide its control. Panel A of Table A1 verifies that the 
firm characteristics between family firms and firms in the control group are indistinguishable. 
Panel B then reports an innovation regression based on these two groups. The positive impact of 
family ownership on innovation remains in a balanced sample.
25
 Table A2 examines the 
robustness of our results by redefining a family dummy based on thresholds of 30% or 40% of 
ownership. These alternative definitions do not alter the positive relationship between family 
ownership and innovation.  
The second set of robustness checks addresses the distribution and availability of our 
dependent variable—innovation. One potential concern about our innovation variables is that they 
are right-skewed with many zeroes. To alleviate this concern, Table A3 presents the result of tests 
focused on firm-year observations with non-zero innovation measures; the results are consistent 
with the main results. Another potential concern is that there could be a two- to three-year lag 
between each patent application date and its final approval (grant) date; hence, our results may be 
driven by those patents applied for but not granted by the end of 2010. To address this concern, 
                                                 
25
 This comparison also addresses potential selection bias, that is, that only superior family firms are listed. 
Because both family and non-family firms in this test have similar characteristics, it is difficult to argue that 
one group is more susceptible to this selection bias. 
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we restrict our sample to the 2000-2007 period and obtain consistent results, as presented in Table 
A4. Table A5 further considers innovation output in two- and three-year horizons. This 
specification also better controls for reverse causality because it is unlikely for future innovation 
output to affect current family ownership once the current R&D level has been controlled for. We 
obtain consistent results from this test.  
The third set of robustness checks addresses concerns about control variables. We first recall 
that Table 2 reports a positive yet insignificant impact of institutional ownership on innovation. 
Table A6 illustrates that this lack of significance arises because high institutional ownership 
implies a high ownership concentration. Once we remove ownership concentration from the tests, 
institutional ownership exhibits a positive and significant impact on innovation. The second 
potential concern is that some omitted long-term variable may drive both innovation and family 
ownership. To address this issue, Table A7 includes lagged innovation output (        )—any 
omitted long-term variables driving both innovation and family ownership should be absorbed by 
lagged innovation. We find that such an adjustment does not change our findings.  
Third, among the control variables, size might play an important role that may not be fully 
captured by a linear control. To determine whether a potential nonlinear impact may exist, we 
also consider size-adjusted innovation performance by scaling the innovation measures with total 
assets. Table A8 reports results that are consistent with our main results. Finally, to ensure that 
our results are not driven by potential different asset sales and acquisition behaviors between 
family and non-family firms, we exclude firm-year observations during which firms engaged in 
asset sales or M&A activities (as acquirer) during t−1 to t+1. Tables A9 and A10 show that our 
main results remain robust to the exclusion of these observations.  
The fourth set of robustness checks concerns our econometric specifications. To alleviate the 
concern that unobservable industry-year factors may drive our results, we include industry-year 
joint fixed effects in our regression for Table A11. We also follow Petersen (2009) and double-
cluster the standard errors by firm and year in Table A12. Our results remain robust to both 
specifications. Overall, tests reported in this Internet Appendix suggest that the main relationship 
between family ownership and innovation is highly robust to alternative specifications. 
Table A13 examines the exclusion restriction of our instrument in which we directly regress 
the four innovation variables on the state-level divorce rate. We find that the instrument has 
insignificant explanatory power for the dependent variables, which provides favorable evidence 
that the instrument meets the exclusion restriction.  
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Table A14 explores the impact of cross-county trust. We obtain the trust measure from the 
General Social Survey (GSS) questionnaire, which asks respondents about the extent to which 
they can trust others. We assign value of 1 when respondents state that they can trust others and 0 
otherwise. The cross-county trust measure is averaged across all respondents from that county in 
2000. In cases where the trust measure is not available in that county in 2000, we use averages 
from the most recent years. In Panel A, we regress innovation on trust, and find that cross-county 
trust in the U.S. does not significantly affect firm-level innovation. The t-statistics of the impact is 
typically approximately 1.5. This marginal lack of significance suggests that the modern 
capitalism institutions adopted in the country may partially offset the otherwise negative impact 
of distrust on innovation, which motivates us to further conduct a two-stage test to explore the 
impact of trust on family ownership in the first stage and the impact of trust-instrumented family 
ownership on innovation in the second stage. Model 1 of Panel B conducts the first-stage test 
from which we find that the prosperity of family firms is indeed associated with low trust. The 
next four models show that low trust-induced family dummies nonetheless promote innovation. 
Panel C applies the same two-stage test by using the variable of family ownership percentage and 
presents very similar results: low-trust is typically associated with higher family ownership in a 
firm, and higher family ownership nonetheless promotes innovation.  
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Table A1 Propensity Score Matching 
 
The sample period ranges from 2000 to 2010. We create a propensity score matched sample via following steps: 1) For each year, we estimate the propensity to be a family firm given various firm 
characteristics by using a Probit model:                     
      , where    is the industry fixed effect at the 2-digit SIC level and X is a vector of control variables measured at t. 2) We rank 
the estimated propensity score obtained in step 1 in ascending order and match each family firm to a non-family firm with the closest propensity score. 3) We repeat steps 1 and 2 for all years in our 
sample. In Panel A, we provide results for t tests on the control variables for family firms and non-family firms matched based on propensity score matching. In Panel B, we estimate the following 
regression model by using family firms and matched non-family firms:                                         , where    is the industry fixed effect at the 2-digit SIC level;    is the year 
fixed effect; X is a vector of control variables measured at t; and the innovation measures are the patent count, patent citation count, patent originality, and patent generality measured at t+1. All other 
variables are defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are presented beneath the coefficients within parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Standard 
errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and are two-way clustered at the industry (2-digit SIC) and year level. 
 
Panel A T Tests on Matched Sample 
 
Panel B Regressions on Matched Sample 
 
Non-family Family p-value 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Propensity Score 0.181 0.181 0.921 
 
VARIABLES Patent,t+1 Citation,t+1 Originality,t+1 Generality,t+1 
Firm age 18.787 19.594 0.170 
 
          
M/B 2.169 2.125 0.547 
 
Family 0.049* 0.074** 0.042* 0.033** 
% Inst Own 0.456 0.474 0.137 
  
(0.029) (0.031) (0.023) (0.014) 
Own Concentration 0.090 0.091 0.464 
 
Firm age 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 
Asset 6.168 6.230 0.177 
  
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) 
R&D 0.619 0.676 0.198 
 
M/B 0.014 0.020 0.012 0.005 
Capital Intensity 5.138 5.229 0.135 
  
(0.012) (0.016) (0.010) (0.005) 
CAPEX 2.815 2.851 0.528 
 
% Inst Own -0.073 -0.102 -0.057 -0.035 
Leverage 0.206 0.207 0.847 
  
(0.066) (0.084) (0.054) (0.032) 
Profit Margin 0.085 0.082 0.365 
 
Own Concentration -0.106 -0.331* -0.035 -0.067 
      
(0.112) (0.187) (0.091) (0.051) 
     
Asset 0.053* 0.044 0.049* 0.023 
      
(0.031) (0.037) (0.025) (0.015) 
     
R&D 0.246*** 0.277*** 0.191*** 0.076** 
      
(0.053) (0.075) (0.043) (0.031) 
     
Capital Intensity 0.018 0.029 0.015 0.015 
      
(0.026) (0.037) (0.023) (0.014) 
     
CAPEX 0.042** 0.074*** 0.032** 0.021** 
      
(0.018) (0.028) (0.015) (0.009) 
     
Leverage -0.125 -0.118 -0.084 -0.004 
      
(0.118) (0.156) (0.097) (0.067) 
     
Profit Margin -0.031 -0.155 -0.084 -0.201 
      
(0.248) (0.340) (0.221) (0.144) 
     
Constant -0.563** -0.535** -0.511*** -0.253* 
      
(0.224) (0.258) (0.196) (0.145) 
          
     
Observations 3,612 3,612 3,612 3,612 
     
R-squared 0.3748 0.2999 0.3559 0.2352 
     
SIC2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
5 
 
Table A2 Alternative Definitions of Family Firm Dummy 
 
The sample period ranges from 2000 to 2010. We estimate the following regression model:                                         , where    is the industry fixed effect at the 2-digit SIC 
level;    is the year fixed effect; X is a vector of control variables measured at t; and the innovation measures are the patent count, patent citation count, patent originality, and patent generality measured 
at t+1. In Panel A, the family dummy is equal to one if the family ownership percentage is above 30%. In Panel B, the family firm dummy is one if the family ownership percentage is above 40%. All 
other variables are defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are presented beneath the coefficients within parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Standard errors are two-way clustered at the industry (2-digit SIC) and year level. 
 
Panel A Family ownership>30% 
 
Panel B Family ownership>40% 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Patent,t+1 Citation,t+1 Originality,t+1 Generality,t+1 
 
VARIABLES Patent,t+1 Citation,t+1 Originality,t+1 Generality,t+1 
          
 
          
Family 0.092** 0.120** 0.078** 0.063** 
 
Family 0.067* 0.118** 0.060** 0.058*** 
 
(0.041) (0.057) (0.036) (0.027) 
  
(0.034) (0.046) (0.030) (0.019) 
Firm age 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 
 
Firm age 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
M/B 0.024*** 0.035*** 0.017*** 0.013** 
 
M/B 0.024*** 0.035*** 0.017*** 0.013** 
 
(0.008) (0.013) (0.005) (0.006) 
  
(0.008) (0.013) (0.005) (0.006) 
% Inst Own -0.001 0.014 -0.014 -0.023 
 
% Inst Own -0.004 0.012 -0.016 -0.024 
 
(0.040) (0.047) (0.031) (0.017) 
  
(0.040) (0.047) (0.031) (0.017) 
Own Concentration 0.509** 0.287 0.529*** 0.248*** 
 
Own Concentration 0.533** 0.306 0.549*** 0.260*** 
 
(0.210) (0.262) (0.178) (0.092) 
  
(0.207) (0.250) (0.177) (0.093) 
Asset 0.069** 0.057 0.065** 0.026 
 
Asset 0.070** 0.057 0.065** 0.026 
 
(0.032) (0.043) (0.028) (0.020) 
  
(0.032) (0.043) (0.028) (0.020) 
R&D 0.313*** 0.344*** 0.253*** 0.114*** 
 
R&D 0.312*** 0.344*** 0.252*** 0.114*** 
 
(0.060) (0.087) (0.052) (0.041) 
  
(0.060) (0.087) (0.052) (0.041) 
Capital Intensity 0.012 0.027 0.007 0.013 
 
Capital Intensity 0.012 0.027 0.007 0.013 
 
(0.030) (0.044) (0.027) (0.021) 
  
(0.030) (0.044) (0.028) (0.021) 
CAPEX 0.087*** 0.122** 0.070** 0.049** 
 
CAPEX 0.087*** 0.122*** 0.070** 0.049** 
 
(0.032) (0.047) (0.028) (0.023) 
  
(0.032) (0.047) (0.028) (0.023) 
Leverage -0.263** -0.416*** -0.226** -0.183** 
 
Leverage -0.265** -0.418*** -0.227** -0.184** 
 
(0.117) (0.159) (0.101) (0.079) 
  
(0.118) (0.160) (0.102) (0.079) 
Profit Margin -0.199 -0.427 -0.096 -0.116 
 
Profit Margin -0.196 -0.425 -0.093 -0.114 
 
(0.260) (0.371) (0.211) (0.123) 
  
(0.261) (0.371) (0.211) (0.123) 
Constant -1.799*** -1.988*** -1.483*** -0.651*** 
 
Constant -1.798*** -1.988*** -1.482*** -0.651*** 
 
(0.387) (0.438) (0.343) (0.216) 
  
(0.387) (0.438) (0.343) (0.216) 
           Observations 17,025 17,025 17,025 17,025 
 
Observations 17,025 17,025 17,025 17,025 
R-squared 0.5172 0.4361 0.4933 0.3466 
 
R-squared 0.5170 0.4360 0.4931 0.3464 
SIC2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
SIC2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table A3: Non-zero Innovation Measures  
 
The sample period ranges from 2000 to 2010. We drop all observations with zero innovation measures. We estimate the following regression model:                                     
    , where    is the industry fixed effect at the 2-digit SIC level;    is the year fixed effect; X is a vector of control variables measured at t; and the innovation measures are the patent count, patent 
citation count, patent originality, and patent generality measured at t+1. Panel A uses the family ownership dummy, and Panel B uses the family ownership percentage. All other variables are defined in 
the Appendix. Standard errors are presented beneath the coefficients within parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and are two-way clustered at the industry (2-digit SIC) and year level. 
 
 
Panel A Family Ownership Dummy 
 
Panel B % Family Ownership 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Patent,t+1 Citation,t+1 Originality,t+1 Generality,t+1 
 
VARIABLES Patent,t+1 Citation,t+1 Originality,t+1 Generality,t+1 
          
 
          
Family 0.237* 0.257* 0.204* 0.228** 
 
% Family Own 0.579** 0.692* 0.533* 0.698*** 
 
(0.124) (0.148) (0.118) (0.104) 
  
(0.291) (0.361) (0.281) (0.240) 
Firm age 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.001 
 
Firm age 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
  
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
M/B 0.023** 0.036*** 0.014* 0.015** 
 
M/B 0.023** 0.036*** 0.014* 0.015** 
 
(0.009) (0.014) (0.008) (0.007) 
  
(0.009) (0.014) (0.008) (0.007) 
% Inst Own 0.010 -0.003 0.005 -0.000 
 
% Inst Own 0.009 -0.001 0.005 0.002 
 
(0.070) (0.117) (0.068) (0.062) 
  
(0.070) (0.115) (0.067) (0.062) 
Own Concentration 0.687 -0.747 0.743 0.069 
 
Own Concentration 0.727 -0.706 0.777 0.103 
 
(0.460) (0.712) (0.546) (0.542) 
  
(0.461) (0.683) (0.544) (0.537) 
Asset 0.254*** 0.167** 0.239*** 0.170*** 
 
Asset 0.253*** 0.166** 0.238*** 0.169*** 
 
(0.048) (0.070) (0.044) (0.055) 
  
(0.048) (0.069) (0.044) (0.054) 
R&D 0.309*** 0.341*** 0.275*** 0.216*** 
 
R&D 0.309*** 0.342*** 0.276*** 0.217*** 
 
(0.025) (0.041) (0.024) (0.029) 
  
(0.025) (0.042) (0.024) (0.030) 
Capital Intensity 0.051 0.097 0.048 0.093* 
 
Capital Intensity 0.052 0.099 0.049 0.096* 
 
(0.049) (0.068) (0.045) (0.053) 
  
(0.049) (0.068) (0.045) (0.053) 
CAPEX 0.152*** 0.269*** 0.135*** 0.163*** 
 
CAPEX 0.152*** 0.269*** 0.135*** 0.164*** 
 
(0.041) (0.054) (0.037) (0.039) 
  
(0.041) (0.054) (0.037) (0.039) 
Leverage -0.699*** -0.958*** -0.646*** -0.685*** 
 
Leverage -0.698*** -0.958*** -0.645*** -0.684*** 
 
(0.164) (0.219) (0.157) (0.160) 
  
(0.164) (0.219) (0.158) (0.160) 
Profit Margin -0.281 -0.280 -0.180 -0.229 
 
Profit Margin -0.276 -0.281 -0.178 -0.230 
 
(0.215) (0.285) (0.209) (0.202) 
  
(0.214) (0.282) (0.208) (0.202) 
Constant -4.991*** -2.544*** -3.357*** -3.902*** 
 
Constant -4.991*** -2.557*** -3.365*** -3.910*** 
 
(0.369) (0.601) (0.361) (0.430) 
  
(0.369) (0.603) (0.361) (0.431) 
           Observations 5,185 3,813 4,992 2,820 
 
Observations 5,185 3,813 4,992 2,820 
R-squared 0.5995 0.5062 0.5858 0.5682 
 
R-squared 0.5996 0.5065 0.5860 0.5692 
SIC2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
SIC2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table A4 Restricted to Patents Filed Before 2008  
 
The sample period ranges from 2000 to 2007. We estimate the following regression model:                                         , where    is the industry fixed effect at the 2-digit SIC 
level;    is the year fixed effect; X is a vector of control variables measured at t; and the innovation measures are the patent count, patent citation count, patent originality, and patent generality measured 
at t+1. Panel A uses the family ownership dummy, and Panel B uses the family ownership percentage. All other variables are defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are presented beneath the 
coefficients within parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and are two-way clustered at the industry 
(2-digit SIC) and year level. 
 
Panel A Family Ownership Dummy 
 
Panel B % Family Ownership 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Patent,t+1 Citation,t+1 Originality,t+1 Generality,t+1 
 
VARIABLES Patent,t+1 Citation,t+1 Originality,t+1 Generality,t+1 
          
 
          
Family 0.078* 0.102** 0.075** 0.068*** 
 
% Family Own 0.156* 0.233** 0.144** 0.136*** 
 
(0.042) (0.051) (0.034) (0.023) 
  
(0.085) (0.104) (0.073) (0.049) 
Firm age 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 
 
Firm age 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
  
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
M/B 0.020*** 0.031** 0.013*** 0.012** 
 
M/B 0.020*** 0.032** 0.013*** 0.012** 
 
(0.007) (0.012) (0.004) (0.005) 
  
(0.007) (0.012) (0.004) (0.005) 
% Inst Own -0.011 -0.009 -0.026 -0.038* 
 
% Inst Own -0.013 -0.010 -0.028 -0.039* 
 
(0.048) (0.053) (0.037) (0.020) 
  
(0.048) (0.053) (0.037) (0.021) 
Own Concentration 0.436** 0.162 0.498*** 0.239** 
 
Own Concentration 0.450** 0.172 0.514*** 0.251** 
 
(0.189) (0.246) (0.167) (0.098) 
  
(0.198) (0.257) (0.173) (0.102) 
Asset 0.080** 0.069 0.077** 0.030 
 
Asset 0.080** 0.070 0.077** 0.031 
 
(0.039) (0.052) (0.034) (0.026) 
  
(0.039) (0.052) (0.034) (0.027) 
R&D 0.390*** 0.448*** 0.318*** 0.150*** 
 
R&D 0.389*** 0.447*** 0.318*** 0.150*** 
 
(0.048) (0.084) (0.044) (0.047) 
  
(0.048) (0.084) (0.044) (0.047) 
Capital Intensity 0.004 0.013 -0.001 0.010 
 
Capital Intensity 0.004 0.013 -0.001 0.010 
 
(0.033) (0.047) (0.030) (0.024) 
  
(0.033) (0.047) (0.030) (0.024) 
CAPEX 0.093*** 0.137*** 0.076** 0.058** 
 
CAPEX 0.093** 0.137*** 0.076** 0.058** 
 
(0.036) (0.051) (0.032) (0.026) 
  
(0.036) (0.051) (0.032) (0.026) 
Leverage -0.253** -0.433*** -0.218** -0.190** 
 
Leverage -0.256** -0.437*** -0.221** -0.193** 
 
(0.114) (0.149) (0.099) (0.079) 
  
(0.115) (0.149) (0.100) (0.079) 
Profit Margin -0.031 -0.223 0.065 -0.050 
 
Profit Margin -0.030 -0.223 0.066 -0.049 
 
(0.293) (0.420) (0.230) (0.147) 
  
(0.294) (0.421) (0.230) (0.147) 
Constant -1.494*** -1.704*** -1.294*** -0.728*** 
 
Constant -1.493*** -1.704*** -1.293*** -0.727*** 
 
(0.296) (0.295) (0.274) (0.163) 
  
(0.296) (0.294) (0.274) (0.164) 
           Observations 13,726 13,726 13,726 13,726 
 
Observations 13,726 13,726 13,726 13,726 
R-squared 0.5810 0.4981 0.5590 0.3996 
 
R-squared 0.5810 0.4981 0.5590 0.3996 
SIC2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
SIC2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table A5 Long-term Effect of Family Ownership on Innovation 
 
The sample period ranges from 2000 to 2010. In Panels A1 and A2, we estimate the following regression model:                                         , where    is the industry fixed 
effect at the 2-digit SIC level;    is the year fixed effect; X is a vector of control variables measured at t; and the innovation measures are the patent count, patent citation count, patent originality, and 
patent generality measured at t+2. Panel A1 uses the family ownership dummy, and Panel A2 uses the family ownership percentage. In Panels B1 and B2, we estimate following regression model: 
                         
      . The innovation measures are the patent count, patent citation count, patent originality, and patent generality measured at t+3. Panel B1 uses the family 
ownership dummy, and Panel B2 uses the family ownership percentage. All other variables are defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are presented beneath the coefficients within parentheses. *, **, 
and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and are two-way clustered at the industry (2-digit SIC) and year level. 
 
Panel A1 Family Firm Dummy 
 
Panel A2 Family Ownership Percentage 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Patent,t+2 Citation,t+2 Originality,t+2 Generality,t+2 
 
VARIABLES Patent,t+2 Citation,t+2 Originality,t+2 Generality,t+2 
          
 
          
Family 0.072* 0.082* 0.068** 0.052** 
 
% Family Own 0.156** 0.210** 0.140** 0.110*** 
 
(0.037) (0.044) (0.029) (0.020) 
  
(0.076) (0.095) (0.064) (0.042) 
Firm age 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 
 
Firm age 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
M/B 0.025*** 0.036*** 0.019*** 0.013** 
 
M/B 0.025*** 0.036*** 0.019*** 0.013** 
 
(0.008) (0.013) (0.006) (0.006) 
  
(0.008) (0.013) (0.006) (0.006) 
% Inst Own -0.016 -0.007 -0.025 -0.025 
 
% Inst Own -0.017 -0.008 -0.026 -0.026 
 
(0.041) (0.048) (0.032) (0.017) 
  
(0.041) (0.049) (0.032) (0.018) 
Own Concentration 0.462*** 0.174 0.491*** 0.202** 
 
Own Concentration 0.471** 0.174 0.502*** 0.209** 
 
(0.176) (0.194) (0.156) (0.083) 
  
(0.183) (0.204) (0.161) (0.085) 
Asset 0.062* 0.041 0.060* 0.019 
 
Asset 0.062* 0.041 0.060* 0.019 
 
(0.035) (0.047) (0.031) (0.020) 
  
(0.035) (0.048) (0.031) (0.020) 
R&D 0.301*** 0.316*** 0.243*** 0.098** 
 
R&D 0.301*** 0.316*** 0.243*** 0.098** 
 
(0.064) (0.089) (0.056) (0.039) 
  
(0.064) (0.089) (0.056) (0.039) 
Capital Intensity 0.020 0.033 0.014 0.013 
 
Capital Intensity 0.020 0.032 0.014 0.013 
 
(0.034) (0.048) (0.030) (0.020) 
  
(0.034) (0.048) (0.030) (0.020) 
CAPEX 0.093*** 0.127*** 0.075** 0.047** 
 
CAPEX 0.093*** 0.126*** 0.075** 0.047** 
 
(0.033) (0.049) (0.029) (0.022) 
  
(0.033) (0.049) (0.029) (0.022) 
Leverage -0.289** -0.386** -0.241** -0.169** 
 
Leverage -0.292** -0.389** -0.244** -0.171** 
 
(0.117) (0.158) (0.100) (0.076) 
  
(0.118) (0.159) (0.100) (0.076) 
Profit Margin -0.179 -0.364 -0.102 -0.076 
 
Profit Margin -0.178 -0.364 -0.101 -0.076 
 
(0.263) (0.329) (0.214) (0.109) 
  
(0.264) (0.330) (0.215) (0.110) 
Constant -0.932*** -0.432* -0.819*** -0.088 
 
Constant -0.932*** -0.432* -0.819*** -0.088 
 
(0.184) (0.248) (0.152) (0.115) 
  
(0.183) (0.248) (0.152) (0.115) 
           Observations 14,412 14,412 14,412 14,412 
 
Observations 14,412 14,412 14,412 14,412 
R-squared 0.5107 0.4220 0.4874 0.3243 
 
R-squared 0.5108 0.4221 0.4874 0.3243 
SIC2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
SIC2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Panel B1 Family Firm Dummy 
 
Panel B2 Family Ownership Percentage 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
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VARIABLES Patent,t+3 Citation,t+3 Originality,t+3 Generality,t+3 
 
VARIABLES Patent,t+3 Citation,t+3 Originality,t+3 Generality,t+3 
          
 
          
Family 0.076** 0.093** 0.067** 0.047** 
 
% Family Own 0.170** 0.233** 0.143** 0.101** 
 
(0.037) (0.043) (0.029) (0.020) 
  
(0.082) (0.096) (0.066) (0.042) 
Firm age 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.001** 
 
Firm age 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.001** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
M/B 0.026*** 0.033** 0.020*** 0.011* 
 
M/B 0.026*** 0.034** 0.020*** 0.011* 
 
(0.008) (0.014) (0.006) (0.006) 
  
(0.008) (0.014) (0.006) (0.006) 
% Inst Own -0.024 -0.016 -0.029 -0.027 
 
% Inst Own -0.026 -0.017 -0.030 -0.028 
 
(0.042) (0.045) (0.033) (0.019) 
  
(0.042) (0.046) (0.033) (0.019) 
Own Concentration 0.350** 0.065 0.390** 0.164* 
 
Own Concentration 0.358* 0.066 0.398** 0.170** 
 
(0.176) (0.223) (0.153) (0.084) 
  
(0.185) (0.233) (0.160) (0.085) 
Asset 0.055 0.034 0.054 0.016 
 
Asset 0.056 0.034 0.054 0.016 
 
(0.038) (0.047) (0.033) (0.019) 
  
(0.038) (0.048) (0.033) (0.019) 
R&D 0.289*** 0.288*** 0.233*** 0.082** 
 
R&D 0.289*** 0.288*** 0.232*** 0.082** 
 
(0.068) (0.090) (0.058) (0.036) 
  
(0.068) (0.090) (0.058) (0.036) 
Capital Intensity 0.024 0.030 0.016 0.011 
 
Capital Intensity 0.024 0.030 0.016 0.011 
 
(0.037) (0.049) (0.032) (0.019) 
  
(0.037) (0.049) (0.032) (0.020) 
CAPEX 0.096*** 0.120** 0.077** 0.040* 
 
CAPEX 0.096*** 0.119** 0.077** 0.040* 
 
(0.035) (0.049) (0.030) (0.021) 
  
(0.035) (0.049) (0.030) (0.021) 
Leverage -0.326*** -0.381** -0.274*** -0.146** 
 
Leverage -0.329*** -0.384** -0.277*** -0.148** 
 
(0.118) (0.149) (0.102) (0.071) 
  
(0.119) (0.150) (0.102) (0.072) 
Profit Margin -0.153 -0.184 -0.084 -0.014 
 
Profit Margin -0.153 -0.185 -0.084 -0.014 
 
(0.263) (0.326) (0.216) (0.133) 
  
(0.264) (0.327) (0.217) (0.133) 
Constant -0.091 0.360 -0.090 0.075 
 
Constant -0.093 0.356 -0.092 0.074 
 
(0.184) (0.258) (0.157) (0.125) 
  
(0.184) (0.258) (0.158) (0.125) 
           Observations 12,035 12,035 12,035 12,035 
 
Observations 12,035 12,035 12,035 12,035 
R-squared 0.5056 0.4054 0.4818 0.2976 
 
R-squared 0.5056 0.4055 0.4818 0.2977 
SIC2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
SIC2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table A6 Reconcile with Aghion et al. (2013) 
 
The sample period ranges from 2000 to 2010. We estimate the following regression model:                                         , where    is the industry fixed effect at the 2-digit SIC 
level;    is the year fixed effect; X is a vector of control variables measured at t; and the innovation measures are the patent count, patent citation count, patent originality, and patent generality measured 
at t+1. Panel A uses the family ownership dummy, and Panel B uses the family ownership percentage. All other variables are defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are presented beneath the 
coefficients within parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and are two-way clustered at the industry 
(2-digit SIC) and year level. 
 
Panel A Family Firm Dummy 
 
Panel B Family Ownership Percentage 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Patent,t+1 Citation,t+1 Originality,t+1 Generality,t+1 
 
VARIABLES Patent,t+1 Citation,t+1 Originality,t+1 Generality,t+1 
          
 
          
Family 0.081** 0.092** 0.077*** 0.061*** 
 
% Family Own 0.147** 0.182** 0.136** 0.118*** 
 
(0.032) (0.038) (0.027) (0.022) 
  
(0.062) (0.077) (0.055) (0.044) 
Firm age 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 
 
Firm age 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
M/B 0.015** 0.021* 0.010* 0.009* 
 
M/B 0.015** 0.022* 0.010** 0.009* 
 
(0.007) (0.012) (0.005) (0.005) 
  
(0.007) (0.012) (0.005) (0.005) 
% Inst Own 0.089* 0.124** 0.061* 0.016 
 
% Inst Own 0.087* 0.123** 0.059* 0.015 
 
(0.049) (0.053) (0.036) (0.015) 
  
(0.049) (0.053) (0.036) (0.015) 
Asset 0.042** 0.024 0.046** 0.023 
 
Asset 0.042** 0.023 0.046** 0.022 
 
(0.019) (0.024) (0.018) (0.014) 
  
(0.019) (0.024) (0.018) (0.014) 
R&D 0.371*** 0.428*** 0.293*** 0.131*** 
 
R&D 0.371*** 0.428*** 0.292*** 0.131*** 
 
(0.067) (0.103) (0.056) (0.044) 
  
(0.067) (0.103) (0.056) (0.044) 
Capital Intensity -0.020 -0.011 -0.021 -0.005 
 
Capital Intensity -0.020 -0.011 -0.021 -0.005 
 
(0.017) (0.020) (0.015) (0.009) 
  
(0.017) (0.020) (0.015) (0.009) 
CAPEX 0.062*** 0.088*** 0.051*** 0.036** 
 
CAPEX 0.062*** 0.088*** 0.051*** 0.036** 
 
(0.020) (0.028) (0.018) (0.015) 
  
(0.020) (0.028) (0.018) (0.015) 
Leverage -0.261* -0.410** -0.222* -0.187** 
 
Leverage -0.263* -0.413** -0.224* -0.189** 
 
(0.148) (0.199) (0.123) (0.087) 
  
(0.149) (0.199) (0.124) (0.088) 
Profit Margin -0.312 -0.552 -0.207 -0.195 
 
Profit Margin -0.310 -0.550 -0.205 -0.194 
 
(0.257) (0.381) (0.208) (0.135) 
  
(0.258) (0.381) (0.208) (0.135) 
Constant -1.176*** -1.330*** -0.996*** -0.522*** 
 
Constant -1.169*** -1.324*** -0.989*** -0.518*** 
 
(0.286) (0.351) (0.257) (0.190) 
  
(0.285) (0.351) (0.256) (0.189) 
           Observations 17,025 17,025 17,025 17,025 
 
Observations 17,025 17,025 17,025 17,025 
R-squared 0.4881 0.4047 0.4659 0.3214 
 
R-squared 0.4880 0.4047 0.4657 0.3213 
SIC2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
SIC2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table A7 Lagged Innovation Included 
 
The sample period ranges from 2000 to 2010. We estimate the following regression model:                                                     , where    is the industry fixed effect at 
the 2-digit SIC level;    is the year fixed effect; X is a vector of control variables measured at t; and the innovation measures are the patent count, patent citation count, patent originality, and patent 
generality measured at t+1. Panel A uses the family ownership dummy, and Panel B uses the family ownership percentage. All other variables are defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are presented 
beneath the coefficients within parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and are two-way clustered at 
the industry (2-digit SIC) and year level. 
 
Panel A Family Ownership Dummy 
 
Panel B % Family Ownership 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Patent,t+1 Citation,t+1 Originality,t+1 Generality,t+1 
 
VARIABLES Patent,t+1 Citation,t+1 Originality,t+1 Generality,t+1 
          
 
          
Family 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.015** 0.003 
 
% Family Own 0.052*** 0.066*** 0.039*** 0.013*** 
 
(0.007) (0.003) (0.007) (0.002) 
  
(0.010) (0.005) (0.013) (0.004) 
Patent,t 0.793*** 
    
Patent,t 0.793*** 
   
 
(0.047) 
     
(0.047) 
   Citations, t 
 
0.670*** 
   
Citations, t 
 
0.670*** 
  
  
(0.045) 
     
(0.045) 
  Originality, t 
  
0.794*** 
  
Originality, t 
  
0.794*** 
 
   
(0.049) 
     
(0.049) 
 Generality, t 
   
0.670*** 
 
Generality, t 
   
0.670*** 
    
(0.062) 
     
(0.062) 
Firm age 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000 
 
Firm age 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
M/B 0.007** 0.011* 0.006** 0.002 
 
M/B 0.008** 0.011* 0.006** 0.002 
 
(0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) 
  
(0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) 
% Inst Own 0.039** 0.022 0.033** 0.007 
 
% Inst Own 0.039** 0.022 0.033** 0.007 
 
(0.016) (0.025) (0.013) (0.009) 
  
(0.016) (0.026) (0.013) (0.009) 
Own Concentration -0.079* -0.084 -0.072* -0.037 
 
Own Concentration -0.080* -0.086 -0.072* -0.038 
 
(0.046) (0.078) (0.040) (0.030) 
  
(0.046) (0.079) (0.040) (0.030) 
Asset -0.003 -0.006 -0.004 -0.008*** 
 
Asset -0.003 -0.006 -0.004 -0.008*** 
 
(0.009) (0.017) (0.006) (0.002) 
  
(0.009) (0.017) (0.006) (0.003) 
R&D -0.012 0.002 -0.014 -0.014** 
 
R&D -0.012 0.002 -0.014 -0.014** 
 
(0.016) (0.021) (0.013) (0.006) 
  
(0.016) (0.021) (0.013) (0.006) 
Capital Intensity 0.012 0.008 0.010 0.004 
 
Capital Intensity 0.012 0.008 0.010 0.004 
 
(0.009) (0.019) (0.008) (0.003) 
  
(0.009) (0.019) (0.008) (0.003) 
CAPEX 0.012 0.029* 0.009 0.006* 
 
CAPEX 0.012 0.029* 0.009 0.006* 
 
(0.009) (0.015) (0.006) (0.003) 
  
(0.009) (0.015) (0.006) (0.003) 
Leverage -0.054 -0.083 -0.042 -0.020 
 
Leverage -0.055 -0.084* -0.043 -0.020 
 
(0.038) (0.051) (0.029) (0.022) 
  
(0.038) (0.051) (0.029) (0.021) 
Profit Margin 0.051 -0.114 0.042 -0.012 
 
Profit Margin 0.051 -0.115 0.042 -0.012 
 
(0.095) (0.136) (0.077) (0.047) 
  
(0.095) (0.135) (0.077) (0.047) 
Constant -0.253** -0.018 -0.151* 0.070*** 
 
Constant -0.253** -0.020 -0.151* 0.070*** 
 
(0.109) (0.069) (0.081) (0.018) 
  
(0.109) (0.069) (0.081) (0.018) 
           Observations 15,278 15,278 15,278 15,278 
 
Observations 15,278 15,278 15,278 15,278 
R-squared 0.8287 0.7400 0.8291 0.7875 
 
R-squared 0.8288 0.7400 0.8291 0.7875 
SIC2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
SIC2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table A8: Innovation Measures Scaled by Firm Size 
 
The sample period ranges from 2000 to 2010. We estimate the following regression model:                                         , where    is the industry fixed effect at 2-digit SIC 
level;    is the year fixed effect; X is a vector of control variables measured at t; and the innovation measures are the patent count, patent citation count, patent originality, and patent generality measured 
at t+1, scaled by log asset at t. Panel A uses the family ownership dummy, and Panel B uses the family ownership percentage. All other variables are defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are 
presented beneath the coefficients within parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and are two-way 
clustered at the industry (2-digit SIC) and year level. 
 
Panel A Family Firm Dummy 
 
Panel B Family Ownership Percentage 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
Patent,t+1 
/Asset,t 
Citation,t+1 
/Asset,t 
Originality,t+1 
/Asset,t 
Generality,t+1 
/Asset,t 
 
VARIABLES 
Patent,t+1 
/Asset,t 
Citation,t+1 
/Asset,t 
Originality,t+1 
/Asset,t 
Generality,t+1 
/Asset,t 
          
 
          
Family 0.070* 0.088* 0.065** 0.057*** 
 
% Family Own 0.148** 0.209** 0.132** 0.116*** 
 
(0.036) (0.046) (0.029) (0.021) 
  
(0.071) (0.092) (0.061) (0.044) 
Firm age 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 
 
Firm age 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
M/B 0.024*** 0.035*** 0.017*** 0.013** 
 
M/B 0.024*** 0.035*** 0.017*** 0.013** 
 
(0.008) (0.013) (0.005) (0.006) 
  
(0.008) (0.013) (0.005) (0.006) 
% Inst Own -0.002 0.014 -0.014 -0.022 
 
% Inst Own -0.003 0.013 -0.015 -0.024 
 
(0.041) (0.047) (0.031) (0.017) 
  
(0.041) (0.047) (0.031) (0.017) 
Own Concentration 0.507** 0.287 0.522*** 0.239*** 
 
Own Concentration 0.516** 0.292 0.533*** 0.248*** 
 
(0.198) (0.245) (0.172) (0.090) 
  
(0.204) (0.252) (0.175) (0.092) 
Asset -0.931*** -0.943*** -0.935*** -0.974*** 
 
Asset -0.930*** -0.943*** -0.934*** -0.974*** 
 
(0.032) (0.043) (0.028) (0.020) 
  
(0.032) (0.043) (0.028) (0.020) 
R&D 0.313*** 0.344*** 0.253*** 0.114*** 
 
R&D 0.313*** 0.344*** 0.253*** 0.114*** 
 
(0.060) (0.087) (0.052) (0.041) 
  
(0.060) (0.087) (0.052) (0.041) 
Capital Intensity 0.012 0.027 0.007 0.013 
 
Capital Intensity 0.012 0.027 0.007 0.013 
 
(0.030) (0.044) (0.027) (0.020) 
  
(0.030) (0.044) (0.027) (0.021) 
CAPEX 0.087*** 0.122*** 0.070** 0.049** 
 
CAPEX 0.087*** 0.122*** 0.070** 0.049** 
 
(0.032) (0.047) (0.028) (0.023) 
  
(0.032) (0.047) (0.028) (0.023) 
Leverage -0.261** -0.413*** -0.223** -0.180** 
 
Leverage -0.264** -0.416*** -0.226** -0.183** 
 
(0.117) (0.159) (0.101) (0.079) 
  
(0.117) (0.160) (0.101) (0.079) 
Profit Margin -0.199 -0.426 -0.096 -0.116 
 
Profit Margin -0.198 -0.426 -0.095 -0.115 
 
(0.260) (0.370) (0.210) (0.122) 
  
(0.260) (0.371) (0.211) (0.123) 
Constant -1.798*** -1.987*** -1.483*** -0.651*** 
 
Constant -1.799*** -1.988*** -1.483*** -0.651*** 
 
(0.386) (0.437) (0.343) (0.216) 
  
(0.387) (0.438) (0.343) (0.216) 
           Observations 17,025 17,025 17,025 17,025 
 
Observations 17,025 17,025 17,025 17,025 
R-squared 0.7346 0.6035 0.7880 0.8872 
 
R-squared 0.7346 0.6035 0.7880 0.8872 
SIC2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
SIC2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table A9: Exclude Firm-year with Asset Sales during t−1 to t+1 
 
The sample period ranges from 2000 to 2010. We include firm-year observations where there are no asset sales (Compustat item 107) during t−1 to t+1. We estimate the following regression model: 
                                        , where    is the industry fixed effect at the 2-digit SIC level;    is the year fixed effect; X is a vector of control variables measured at t; and the 
innovation measures are the patent count, patent citation count, patent originality, and patent generality measured at t+1. Panel A uses the family ownership dummy, and Panel B uses the family 
ownership percentage. All other variables are defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are presented beneath the coefficients within parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, 
and 1%, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and are two-way clustered at the industry (2-digit SIC) and year level. 
 
 
Panel A Family Firm Dummy 
 
Panel B Family Ownership Percentage 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Patent,t+1 Citation,t+1 Originality,t+1 Generality,t+1 
 
VARIABLES Patent,t+1 Citation,t+1 Originality,t+1 Generality,t+1 
          
 
          
Family 0.087* 0.083 0.085** 0.063* 
 
% Family Own 0.174** 0.187 0.155** 0.116* 
 
(0.048) (0.062) (0.041) (0.035) 
  
(0.086) (0.121) (0.076) (0.063) 
Firm age 0.004** 0.005** 0.004** 0.002* 
 
Firm age 0.004** 0.005** 0.004** 0.002** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
  
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
M/B 0.032** 0.043** 0.024** 0.015* 
 
M/B 0.032** 0.043** 0.024** 0.015* 
 
(0.013) (0.019) (0.010) (0.008) 
  
(0.013) (0.019) (0.010) (0.008) 
% Inst Own -0.051 -0.062 -0.055 -0.045 
 
% Inst Own -0.052 -0.063 -0.057 -0.046 
 
(0.049) (0.075) (0.039) (0.030) 
  
(0.049) (0.076) (0.039) (0.031) 
Own 
Concentration 0.786*** 0.575** 0.762*** 0.377*** 
 
Own 
Concentration 0.807*** 0.587* 0.789*** 0.397*** 
 
(0.278) (0.287) (0.248) (0.137) 
  
(0.290) (0.301) (0.260) (0.148) 
Asset 0.084** 0.069 0.074** 0.031 
 
Asset 0.084** 0.069 0.075** 0.031 
 
(0.041) (0.049) (0.036) (0.021) 
  
(0.041) (0.050) (0.036) (0.021) 
R&D 0.292*** 0.292*** 0.237*** 0.095** 
 
R&D 0.292*** 0.291*** 0.236*** 0.094** 
 
(0.062) (0.086) (0.054) (0.038) 
  
(0.062) (0.086) (0.054) (0.038) 
Capital Intensity -0.004 0.014 -0.006 0.006 
 
Capital Intensity -0.004 0.014 -0.006 0.006 
 
(0.025) (0.037) (0.021) (0.015) 
  
(0.025) (0.037) (0.021) (0.016) 
CAPEX 0.068** 0.100** 0.057** 0.038** 
 
CAPEX 0.067** 0.099** 0.057** 0.038** 
 
(0.028) (0.047) (0.026) (0.019) 
  
(0.028) (0.047) (0.026) (0.019) 
Leverage -0.299* -0.418* -0.253* -0.155* 
 
Leverage -0.302* -0.421* -0.256* -0.157* 
 
(0.173) (0.220) (0.151) (0.093) 
  
(0.172) (0.219) (0.150) (0.093) 
Profit Margin 0.030 -0.198 0.096 -0.033 
 
Profit Margin 0.032 -0.197 0.100 -0.031 
 
(0.340) (0.389) (0.286) (0.145) 
  
(0.339) (0.389) (0.285) (0.144) 
Constant -0.476** 0.053 -0.440*** -0.048 
 
Constant -0.477** 0.051 -0.440*** -0.048 
 
(0.213) (0.298) (0.163) (0.117) 
  
(0.214) (0.299) (0.164) (0.118) 
           Observations 7,072 7,072 7,072 7,072 
 
Observations 7,072 7,072 7,072 7,072 
R-squared 0.5119 0.4208 0.4881 0.3285 
 
R-squared 0.5119 0.4208 0.4880 0.3283 
SIC2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
SIC2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table A10: Exclude Firm-years with M&A during t-1 to t+1 
 
The sample period ranges from 2000 to 2010. We exclude firm-year observations where firms engage in M&A activities (as acquirer) during t−1 to t+1. M&A information is from SDC. We estimate the 
following regression model:                                         , where    is the industry fixed effect at the 2-digit SIC level;    is the year fixed effect; X is a vector of control 
variables measured at t; and the innovation measures are the patent count, patent citation count, patent originality, and patent generality measured at t+1. Panel A uses the family ownership dummy, and 
Panel B uses the family ownership percentage. All other variables are defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are presented beneath the coefficients within parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and are two-way clustered at the industry (2-digit SIC) and year level. 
 
Panel A Family Firm Dummy 
 
Panel B Family Ownership Percentage 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Patent,t+1 Citation,t+1 Originality,t+1 Generality,t+1 
 
VARIABLES Patent,t+1 Citation,t+1 Originality,t+1 Generality,t+1 
          
 
          
Family 0.050 0.079* 0.046* 0.042*** 
 
% Family Own 0.101* 0.161** 0.089* 0.082** 
 
(0.032) (0.040) (0.025) (0.016) 
  
(0.061) (0.075) (0.052) (0.033) 
Firm age 0.003** 0.004** 0.003** 0.002** 
 
Firm age 0.003** 0.004** 0.003** 0.002** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
  
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
M/B 0.013* 0.018* 0.008* 0.008** 
 
M/B 0.013* 0.018* 0.008* 0.008** 
 
(0.007) (0.010) (0.005) (0.004) 
  
(0.007) (0.010) (0.005) (0.004) 
% Inst Own 0.001 -0.031 -0.002 -0.024 
 
% Inst Own -0.000 -0.033 -0.003 -0.025 
 
(0.047) (0.057) (0.035) (0.028) 
  
(0.048) (0.058) (0.035) (0.028) 
Own Concentration 0.251 0.148 0.267** 0.115** 
 
Own Concentration 0.260* 0.161 0.277** 0.123** 
 
(0.155) (0.232) (0.119) (0.058) 
  
(0.157) (0.235) (0.121) (0.060) 
Asset 0.055** 0.049 0.052** 0.026 
 
Asset 0.055** 0.049 0.052** 0.026 
 
(0.027) (0.037) (0.023) (0.017) 
  
(0.027) (0.037) (0.023) (0.017) 
R&D 0.317*** 0.367*** 0.254*** 0.117*** 
 
R&D 0.317*** 0.366*** 0.253*** 0.116*** 
 
(0.060) (0.090) (0.050) (0.040) 
  
(0.060) (0.090) (0.050) (0.040) 
Capital Intensity 0.009 0.031 0.005 0.009 
 
Capital Intensity 0.009 0.031 0.005 0.009 
 
(0.024) (0.036) (0.021) (0.016) 
  
(0.024) (0.036) (0.021) (0.016) 
CAPEX 0.066*** 0.097*** 0.049*** 0.028** 
 
CAPEX 0.065*** 0.097*** 0.049*** 0.027** 
 
(0.023) (0.034) (0.018) (0.012) 
  
(0.023) (0.034) (0.018) (0.012) 
Leverage -0.183* -0.372** -0.143* -0.119** 
 
Leverage -0.185* -0.376** -0.146* -0.121** 
 
(0.101) (0.151) (0.083) (0.060) 
  
(0.101) (0.152) (0.084) (0.060) 
Profit Margin -0.059 -0.156 0.006 0.008 
 
Profit Margin -0.058 -0.155 0.007 0.009 
 
(0.235) (0.313) (0.165) (0.074) 
  
(0.235) (0.313) (0.166) (0.074) 
Constant -0.603*** -0.381* -0.519*** -0.114 
 
Constant -0.604*** -0.382* -0.519*** -0.114 
 
(0.183) (0.207) (0.160) (0.111) 
  
(0.183) (0.207) (0.161) (0.112) 
           Observations 11,666 11,666 11,666 11,666 
 
Observations 11,666 11,666 11,666 11,666 
R-squared 0.4910 0.4098 0.4660 0.3247 
 
R-squared 0.4909 0.4098 0.4659 0.3246 
SIC2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
SIC2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table A11 Industry-year Joint Fixed Effects  
 
The sample period ranges from 2000 to 2010. We estimate the following regression model:                                       , where     is the industry-year joint fixed effect at the 2-
digit SIC level in every year; X is a vector of control variables measured at t; and the innovation measures are the patent count, patent citation count, patent originality, and patent generality measured at 
t+1. Panel A uses the family ownership dummy, and Panel B uses the family ownership percentage. All other variables are defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are presented beneath the 
coefficients within parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and are two-way clustered at the industry 
(2-digit SIC) and year level. 
 
Panel A Family Firm Dummy 
 
Panel B Family Ownership Percentage 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Patent,t+1 Citation,t+1 Originality,t+1 Generality,t+1 
 
VARIABLES Patent,t+1 Citation,t+1 Originality,t+1 Generality,t+1 
          
 
          
Family 0.061* 0.067* 0.058** 0.045*** 
 
% Family Own 0.126* 0.155* 0.113** 0.088*** 
 
(0.036) (0.036) (0.027) (0.013) 
  
(0.070) (0.087) (0.057) (0.029) 
Firm age 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 
 
Firm age 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
M/B 0.019*** 0.026*** 0.013*** 0.010*** 
 
M/B 0.020*** 0.026*** 0.014*** 0.010*** 
 
(0.007) (0.009) (0.004) (0.003) 
  
(0.007) (0.009) (0.004) (0.003) 
% Inst Own -0.012 -0.008 -0.023 -0.032* 
 
% Inst Own -0.013 -0.009 -0.024 -0.033* 
 
(0.047) (0.053) (0.037) (0.019) 
  
(0.047) (0.053) (0.037) (0.019) 
Own Concentration 0.503** 0.271 0.525*** 0.230** 
 
Own Concentration 0.513** 0.276 0.535*** 0.239*** 
 
(0.190) (0.218) (0.173) (0.087) 
  
(0.197) (0.230) (0.177) (0.087) 
Asset 0.070** 0.069* 0.066** 0.032* 
 
Asset 0.070** 0.070* 0.066** 0.032* 
 
(0.032) (0.041) (0.028) (0.017) 
  
(0.032) (0.041) (0.028) (0.017) 
R&D 0.323*** 0.362*** 0.261*** 0.121*** 
 
R&D 0.322*** 0.361*** 0.261*** 0.121*** 
 
(0.038) (0.048) (0.033) (0.022) 
  
(0.038) (0.048) (0.033) (0.022) 
Capital Intensity 0.003 0.009 -0.000 0.006 
 
Capital Intensity 0.003 0.009 -0.000 0.006 
 
(0.031) (0.043) (0.028) (0.020) 
  
(0.031) (0.043) (0.028) (0.020) 
CAPEX 0.081** 0.098** 0.065** 0.038* 
 
CAPEX 0.081** 0.098** 0.065** 0.038* 
 
(0.034) (0.045) (0.030) (0.020) 
  
(0.034) (0.045) (0.030) (0.020) 
Leverage -0.254** -0.374*** -0.217** -0.161** 
 
Leverage -0.257** -0.376*** -0.219** -0.163** 
 
(0.118) (0.137) (0.101) (0.069) 
  
(0.118) (0.138) (0.102) (0.069) 
Profit Margin -0.087 -0.229 0.003 -0.028 
 
Profit Margin -0.086 -0.229 0.004 -0.027 
 
(0.261) (0.342) (0.200) (0.102) 
  
(0.261) (0.342) (0.200) (0.102) 
Constant -1.671*** -1.864*** -1.394*** -0.717*** 
 
Constant -1.672*** -1.865*** -1.394*** -0.717*** 
 
(0.244) (0.258) (0.236) (0.157) 
  
(0.244) (0.258) (0.237) (0.157) 
           Observations 17,025 17,025 17,025 17,025 
 
Observations 17,025 17,025 17,025 17,025 
R-squared 0.5645 0.5150 0.5407 0.4380 
 
R-squared 0.5645 0.5151 0.5407 0.4379 
SIC2-year joint FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
SIC2-year joint FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
  
16 
 
Table A12 Standard Errors Two-way Clustered by Firm and Year 
 
The sample period ranges from 2000 to 2010. We estimate the following regression model:                                         , where    is the industry fixed effect at the 2-digit SIC 
level;    is the year fixed effect; X is a vector of control variables measured at t; and the innovation measures are the patent count, patent citation count, patent originality, and patent generality measured 
at t+1. Panel A uses the family ownership dummy, and Panel B uses the family ownership percentage. All other variables are defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are presented beneath the 
coefficients within parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the firm and year level. 
 
Panel A Family Firm Dummy 
 
Panel B Family Ownership Percentage 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Patent,t+1 Citation,t+1 Originality,t+1 Generality,t+1 
 
VARIABLES Patent,t+1 Citation,t+1 Originality,t+1 Generality,t+1 
          
 
          
Family 0.070* 0.088 0.065* 0.057** 
 
% Family Own 0.148* 0.209* 0.132* 0.116** 
 
(0.042) (0.057) (0.035) (0.025) 
  
(0.084) (0.114) (0.070) (0.049) 
Firm age 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 
 
Firm age 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
  
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
M/B 0.024*** 0.035*** 0.017*** 0.013** 
 
M/B 0.024*** 0.035*** 0.017*** 0.013** 
 
(0.007) (0.013) (0.006) (0.006) 
  
(0.007) (0.013) (0.006) (0.006) 
% Inst Own -0.002 0.014 -0.014 -0.022 
 
% Inst Own -0.003 0.013 -0.015 -0.024 
 
(0.044) (0.058) (0.036) (0.022) 
  
(0.044) (0.058) (0.036) (0.023) 
Own Concentration 0.507*** 0.287 0.522*** 0.239** 
 
Own Concentration 0.516*** 0.292 0.533*** 0.248*** 
 
(0.179) (0.257) (0.145) (0.093) 
  
(0.179) (0.256) (0.145) (0.095) 
Asset 0.069*** 0.057* 0.065*** 0.026 
 
Asset 0.070*** 0.057* 0.066*** 0.026 
 
(0.024) (0.032) (0.021) (0.016) 
  
(0.024) (0.032) (0.021) (0.016) 
R&D 0.313*** 0.344*** 0.253*** 0.114*** 
 
R&D 0.313*** 0.344*** 0.253*** 0.114*** 
 
(0.055) (0.083) (0.047) (0.039) 
  
(0.055) (0.083) (0.047) (0.039) 
Capital Intensity 0.012 0.027 0.007 0.013 
 
Capital Intensity 0.012 0.027 0.007 0.013 
 
(0.020) (0.030) (0.017) (0.010) 
  
(0.020) (0.030) (0.017) (0.010) 
CAPEX 0.087*** 0.122*** 0.070*** 0.049*** 
 
CAPEX 0.087*** 0.122*** 0.070*** 0.049*** 
 
(0.018) (0.027) (0.016) (0.014) 
  
(0.018) (0.027) (0.016) (0.014) 
Leverage -0.261*** -0.413*** -0.223*** -0.180*** 
 
Leverage -0.264*** -0.416*** -0.226*** -0.183*** 
 
(0.089) (0.135) (0.077) (0.063) 
  
(0.089) (0.136) (0.077) (0.064) 
Profit Margin -0.199 -0.426 -0.096 -0.116 
 
Profit Margin -0.198 -0.426 -0.095 -0.115 
 
(0.171) (0.282) (0.157) (0.120) 
  
(0.171) (0.282) (0.157) (0.120) 
Constant -1.798*** -1.987*** -1.483*** -0.651*** 
 
Constant -1.799*** -1.988*** -1.483*** -0.651*** 
 
(0.190) (0.270) (0.174) (0.157) 
  
(0.191) (0.270) (0.174) (0.157) 
           Observations 17,025 17,025 17,025 17,025 
 
Observations 17,025 17,025 17,025 17,025 
R-squared 0.5171 0.4360 0.4932 0.3467 
 
R-squared 0.5171 0.4361 0.4932 0.3466 
SIC2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
SIC2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table A13 Exclusion Restrictions of the Instrument 
 
The sample period ranges from 2000 to 2010. We estimate the following regression model: 
                                            , where    is the industry fixed effect at the 2-digit SIC level;    is the year 
fixed effect; Instrument is the state divorce rate at t; X is a vector of control variables measured at t; and the innovation measures are 
the patent count, patent citation count, patent originality, and patent generality measured at t+1. All other variables are defined in the 
Appendix. Standard errors are presented beneath the coefficients within parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 
5% and 1%, respectively. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the industry (2-digit SIC) and year level. 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Patent,t+1 Citation,t+1 Originality,t+1 Generality,t+1 
          
State Divorce 0.029 0.034 0.023 0.009 
 
(0.020) (0.025) (0.016) (0.008) 
Firm age 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
M/B 0.024*** 0.035*** 0.016*** 0.011* 
 
(0.009) (0.013) (0.006) (0.006) 
% Inst Own -0.041 -0.040 -0.043 -0.037* 
 
(0.035) (0.051) (0.029) (0.022) 
Own Concentration 0.328** 0.103 0.354*** 0.155** 
 
(0.158) (0.242) (0.126) (0.077) 
Asset 0.088** 0.086* 0.076** 0.031 
 
(0.034) (0.048) (0.030) (0.022) 
R&D 0.297*** 0.334*** 0.242*** 0.113*** 
 
(0.054) (0.080) (0.047) (0.038) 
Capital Intensity -0.017 -0.011 -0.016 0.001 
 
(0.024) (0.036) (0.022) (0.017) 
CAPEX 0.062** 0.087** 0.051* 0.036* 
 
(0.029) (0.044) (0.026) (0.020) 
Leverage -0.168* -0.267* -0.137 -0.105* 
 
(0.101) (0.140) (0.084) (0.057) 
Profit Margin -0.388 -0.585* -0.236 -0.148 
 
(0.244) (0.354) (0.195) (0.125) 
Constant -1.663*** -1.856*** -1.357*** -0.583*** 
 
(0.275) (0.331) (0.219) (0.149) 
     Observations 17,025 17,025 17,025 17,025 
R-squared 0.4992 0.4188 0.4777 0.3341 
SIC2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table A14: Impact of Cross-county Trust 
 
The sample period ranges from 2000 to 2010. Panel A reports the results of the following regression:                  
                    , where    is the industry fixed effect at the 2-digit SIC level;    is the year fixed effect; and        is the 
county-level trust constructed from the General Social Survey (GSS) survey conducted in 2000. Panels B and C estimate the following 
two-stage regression model:                                           in the 1
st stage, and                  
           -                      in the 2
nd stage, where           refers to the family firm dummy in Panel B and the family 
ownership percentage in Panel C, respectively, and          -          is the projected value of family variables computed from the 
first stage. In both Panels B and C, Column 1 reports the first-stage regressions and Columns 2-5 report the second-stage regressions. 
All other variables are defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are presented beneath the coefficients within parentheses. *, **, and 
*** denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and are two-way 
clustered at the industry (2-digit SIC) and year level. 
 
Panel A Exclusion Restriction 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Patent,t+1 Citation, t+1 Originality, t+1 Generality, t+1 
     Trust 0.201 0.219 0.160 0.035 
 
(0.145) (0.149) (0.125) (0.058) 
Firm age 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
M/B 0.021* 0.030* 0.014* 0.012** 
 
(0.011) (0.018) (0.008) (0.006) 
% Inst Own -0.024 -0.007 -0.034 -0.033 
 
(0.057) (0.057) (0.049) (0.028) 
Own Concentration 0.625** 0.414 0.643** 0.340 
 
(0.280) (0.331) (0.291) (0.208) 
Asset 0.075** 0.058 0.072** 0.032 
 
(0.035) (0.045) (0.033) (0.021) 
R&D 0.302*** 0.327*** 0.245*** 0.109*** 
 
(0.062) (0.087) (0.055) (0.040) 
Capital Intensity 0.000 0.011 -0.005 0.004 
 
(0.045) (0.069) (0.039) (0.032) 
CAPEX 0.084* 0.118 0.067* 0.045 
 
(0.048) (0.076) (0.039) (0.030) 
Leverage -0.254 -0.430 -0.227 -0.189 
 
(0.213) (0.280) (0.180) (0.123) 
Profit Margin -0.123 -0.373 -0.004 -0.065 
 
(0.357) (0.453) (0.282) (0.167) 
Constant -0.570 0.042 -0.504 0.051 
 
(0.347) (0.321) (0.332) (0.185) 
     Observations 12,837 12,837 12,837 12,837 
R-squared 0.5101 0.4297 0.4868 0.3425 
SIC2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Panel B Family Firm Dummy 
 
Panel C Family Ownership Percentage 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Family 
Patent,t+
1 
Citation, 
t+1 
Originality, 
t+1 
Generality, 
t+1 
 
VARIABLES 
% Family 
Own 
Patent,t+
1 
Citation, 
t+1 
Originality, 
t+1 
Generality, 
t+1 
            
 
            
Family 
 
1.526*** 2.179*** 1.272*** 0.846*** 
 
% Family Own 
 
2.327*** 3.556*** 2.031*** 1.492*** 
  
(0.026) (0.232) (0.145) (0.013) 
   
(0.068) (0.087) (0.052) (0.030) 
Trust -0.112** 
     
Trust -0.138** 
    
 
(0.047) 
      
(0.058) 
    Firm age -0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.002*** 
 
Firm age -0.005*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) 
  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
M/B -0.047*** 0.034*** 0.047*** 0.025*** 0.018*** 
 
M/B -0.054*** 0.032*** 0.046*** 0.024*** 0.018*** 
 
(0.006) (0.004) (0.010) (0.005) (0.002) 
  
(0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) 
% Inst Own -0.253*** 0.082*** 0.141* 0.054 0.025 
 
% Inst Own -0.315*** 0.035 0.078** 0.017 0.003 
 
(0.040) (0.027) (0.074) (0.047) (0.015) 
  
(0.044) (0.025) (0.037) (0.021) (0.015) 
Own 
Concentration 1.460*** 
-
0.642*** -1.381*** -0.414* -0.354*** 
 
Own 
Concentration 1.897*** -0.096 -0.677*** 0.012 -0.117 
 
(0.199) (0.154) (0.396) (0.231) (0.089) 
  
(0.204) (0.148) (0.215) (0.125) (0.087) 
Asset -0.113*** 0.106*** 0.098** 0.098*** 0.048*** 
 
Asset -0.112*** 0.102*** 0.100*** 0.097*** 0.051*** 
 
(0.023) (0.015) (0.047) (0.033) (0.009) 
  
(0.025) (0.015) (0.021) (0.012) (0.009) 
R&D 
 
0.249*** 0.263*** 0.199*** 0.084*** 
 
R&D 
 
0.263*** 0.267*** 0.207*** 0.080*** 
  
(0.006) (0.038) (0.025) (0.003) 
   
(0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.003) 
Capital Intensity -0.080*** 0.044*** 0.066 0.032 0.025*** 
 
Capital 
Intensity -0.119*** 0.030** 0.054*** 0.023** 0.023*** 
 
(0.019) (0.012) (0.062) (0.039) (0.007) 
  
(0.020) (0.012) (0.017) (0.010) (0.007) 
CAPEX -0.034* 0.092*** 0.129** 0.074** 0.049*** 
 
CAPEX -0.065*** 0.086*** 0.121*** 0.069*** 0.046*** 
 
(0.019) (0.012) (0.051) (0.031) (0.007) 
  
(0.020) (0.012) (0.017) (0.010) (0.007) 
Leverage 0.214** 
-
0.259*** -0.413*** -0.234** -0.181*** 
 
Leverage -0.046 
-
0.284*** -0.470*** -0.260*** -0.210*** 
 
(0.089) (0.060) (0.151) (0.106) (0.035) 
  
(0.097) (0.058) (0.083) (0.048) (0.034) 
Profit Margin 0.520*** 
-
0.359*** -0.684* -0.204 -0.184*** 
 
Profit Margin 0.874*** 
-
0.258*** -0.570*** -0.129* -0.151*** 
 
(0.147) (0.093) (0.389) (0.233) (0.054) 
  
(0.169) (0.090) (0.130) (0.076) (0.053) 
Constant -2.714*** 
-
2.426*** -2.447*** -2.027*** -0.925** 
 
Constant -1.993 
-
2.307*** -2.372** -1.954*** -0.930** 
 
(0.659) (0.729) (0.696) (0.569) (0.422) 
  
(1.755) (0.700) (1.016) (0.590) (0.414) 
             Observations 12,837 12,837 12,837 12,837 12,837 
 
Observations 12,837 12,837 12,837 12,837 12,837 
SIC2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
SIC2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
   
